The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof May Weaken the Presumption of Innocence by Sheppard, Stephen M
Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles School of Law Faculty Scholarship
2003
The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How
Changes in the Burden of Proof May Weaken the
Presumption of Innocence
Stephen M. Sheppard
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information,
please contact jlloyd@stmarytx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen M. Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof May Weaken the
Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165 (2003).
THE METAMORPHOSES OF REASONABLE DOUBT:
HOW CHANGES IN THE BURDEN OF PROOF
HAVE WEAKENED THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE
Steve Sheppard*
Words change their meanings in ways that trap the historically unwary.
I. BEFORE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: CONVICTIONS VS.
D o uBTs ................................................... 1170
II. THE SEVENTEENTH THROUGH THE NINETEENTH CENTURIES:
THE STANDARD ARISES-MORAL CERTAINTY AND REASONABLE
D O U BT ................................................... 1176
A. M oral Certainty ....................................... 1176
B. Bishop Wilkins, Moral Certainty, and Reasonable Doubt ... 1178
C. Moral Certainty and the Law ........................... 1180
D. Reasonableness of theJuror's Doubts ..................... 1183
* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. I am grateful for
the comments of Steve Bibas, Marius Bolten, Russell Christopher, Martin Flaherty,
George Fletcher, Philip Hamburger, Alon Harel, Dick Helmholz, Kyron Huigens, Ed
lmwinkelreid, Don Judges, Mark Killenbeck, William Nelson, Ed Rubin, Pierre
Schlag, andJeremy Waldron on various sketches of this paper, and for the criticism of
the University of Chicago Legal History Workshop, the Columbia Law School
Seminar in Criminal Theory, the Colloquium in Legal History at New York University,
and the Works in Progress panel at the University of Arkansas. This Article could not
have been completed without the assistance of my student Blake Rutherford, and of
Glen-Peter Ahlers, David Gay, and the staff of the University of Arkansas Law Library,
or of Kent McKeever, Whitney Bagnall, and the staff of the Diamond Law Library at
Columbia. My thanks, especially, to George, from whom I nicked the title.
This Article is dedicated with respect to the two mentors whose care, guidance,
and example have benefited not only me but my students more than they will know,
the Honorable E. Grady jolly, Jr., and the Honorable William Barbour, Jr., in
recognition of their twenty years of service on the benches, respectively, of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi.
1 Christopher Hill, 'Reason" and "Reasonableness" in Seventeenth-Century England,
20 BRrr. J. Soc. 235, 236 (1969).
1165
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Ill. THE MERGER OF REASONABLE DOUBT AND MORAL
C ERTAINTY . ............................................... 1195
IV. THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES: REASONABLE
DOUBT BECOMES ARTICULABLE DOUBT ..................... 1204
A. Reasonable Doubts Become Specific and Articulable Doubts.. 1206
B. Articulability Encouraged by the Pressure of the Advocates
and y Confusion with Other Rules ...................... 1214
V. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: REASONABLE DOUBT
ENSHRINED-OR PETRIFIED ................................ 1216
A. Reasonable Doubt Becomes Constitutionally Enshrined, and
Moral Certainty Takes a Beating ........................ 1217
B. The Difficulties of Articulability Continue ................. 1223
C. Articulable Doubt and the Presumption of Innocence ....... 1226
VI. TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES: DOUBTS ABOUT
REASONABLE DOUBT ...................................... 1227
A. Wigmoreans and the Instruction ......................... 1228
B. The Multiplicity of Meanings for Reasonable Doubt I: As
Judgment of a Reasonable Juror ......................... 1231
C. The Multiplicity of Meanings for Reasonable Doubt II: As a
M odfier of Doubts ..................................... 1233
D. As a Contingent View of Judgment, Reasonableness Is
Controversial .......................................... 1234
E. Articulable Reasonableness and the Presumption of Innocence 1237
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS .............. 1239
A. The Significance of Reasonable-Doubt Instructions Has
Changed .............................................. 1239
B. The Change May Fundamentally Alter the Presumption of
Innocence ............................................. 1239
C. The Instruction Intrudes on Juror Discretion .............. 1240
D. There Is a Need for Further Empirical Research ............ 1244
APPENDIX: SAMPLE MODELJURY INSTRUCTIONS 1999 ............... 1246
The standard of criminal proof beyond a reasonable doubt is be-
lieved almost everywhere to be a bulwark of protection for the ac-
cused, an assurance that the state will not punish the innocent to
snare more easily the guilty. A popular icon of the law generally,
2 it is
2 Indeed, the term has not only thickened the plot but broadcast the title of
several popular books lately. See, e.g., JEFFREY ARCHER, BEYOND RE;ASONABLE DouBr
(1994); PHILP FRIEDMAN, REASONAB, LE DoUBr (1990); TOBY MARLOWE, BEYOND A REA-
SONABLE DouBr (1997). One of director Fritz Lang's last films was BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DoUBr (RKO 1956).
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thought to be one of the glories of the common law. 3 It is often be-
lieved to help ensure that the prosecution has the burden of persua-
sion, by which the state must prove the defendant's guilt and the
defendant is presumed innocent.4 These beliefs, however, do not as-
say well against the touchstone of history.
A great many scholars have been drawn to study the instruction,
to examine both its operation, particularly whether jurors are accu-
3 Many are the paeans to reasonable doubt. See, for example, those collected in
Scott Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS LJ.
457, 457-62 (1989). None have been as significant to American criminal law as those
raised thirty years ago, when the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a constitutional re-
quirement that juries find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Brennan
then wrote,
The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation ......
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American
scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk
of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete sub-
stance for the presumption of innocence-that bedrock "axiomatic and ele-
mentary" principle whose "enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law."
In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-63 (1970) (citations omitted); see also infra Part IV.
Such sentiments have led to the international spread of the standard as a rule of law.
See, e.g., Article 66 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (as of July 17, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/stattite/
romefra.htm. Article 66 provides:
1. Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the
Court in accordance with the applicable law.
2. The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused.
3. In order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
4 There is a necessary interrelationship between the burden of proof and bur-
den of persuasion in any argument, much less a legal argument or criminal trial.
Thus, such statements are often made hand in glove, as in Justice Frankfurter's claim
that
[f]rom the time that the law which we have inherited has emerged from
dark and barbaric times, the conception of justice which has dominated our
criminal law has refused to put an accused at the hazard of punishment if he
fails to remove every reasonable doubt of his innocence in the minds of
jurors. It is the duty of the Government to establish his guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts
of a free society-is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in
the historic, procedural content of "due process." Accordingly there can be
no doubt, I repeat, that a State cannot cast upon an accused the duty of
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that his was not the act which caused
the death of another.
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also
infra Part VI.E.
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rately applying its confusing and varied formulations, and its essence,
particularly whether the instruction sufficiently protects the accused.5
None of their works, however, have considered fully the implications
of the historical development of variations among the instructions
upon the role of the juror or upon the function of the presumption of
innocence. As a result, despite this frequency of academic considera-
tion, the outstanding variation of the instruction in the twentieth cen-
tury, defining reasonable doubt as a doubt for which a reason can be
given, has received little consideration from the academy."
This Article, therefore, presents a brief history of the instruction
with emphasis on these points and one other. Historians have ex-
amined the origins of the doctrine, its antecedents in seventeenth-
century England and its use in eighteenth-century common-law
courts.7 The standard's evolution after 1850 and the significance of
5 For recent discussions, see, for example, Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Reasonable
Certainty and Reasonable Doubt, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 655, 681-97 (1998) (examining the
operation); Melissa Corwin, Defining "Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt "for the Criminal
Jury: The Third Circuit Accepts an Invitation To Tolerate Constitutionally Inadequate Phraseol-
ogy, 46 VILL. L. REV. 829, 833-43 (2001) (examining the operation); Stephen J. For-
tunato, Jr., Instructing on Reasonable Doubt After Victor v. Nebraska: A Trial judge's
Certain Thoughts on Certainty, 41 VILL. L. REV. 365, 378-429 (1996) (examining both
essence and operation); Lawrence V. Johnston 111, The Instruction on Reasonable Doubt:
200 Years of Sophishy Is Enough, 72 FLA. B:l. 61, 61 (1998) (examining the operation);
Thomas V. Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in the World Is It Defined? 12 AM. U.J. INT'L
L. & POL'V 195, 199-210 (1997) (examining both essence and operation); Timothy P.
O'Neill, Instructing Illinois Juries on the Definition of "Reasonable Doubt " The Need For Re-
form, 27 Lov. U. Cvu. L.J. 921, 924-54 (1996) (examining the operation); Lawrence
M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable
Doubt, 78 TEx. L. REV. 105, 109-32 (1999) (examining the essence); Elisabeth Stof-
felmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in Ex-
plaining "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt", 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 769, 777 (2000)
(examining the essence); Colin Moran, Note, Cardinal Newman and jury Verdicts: Rea-
son, Belief and Certitude, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 63, 72-90 (1996) (examining the es-
sence). Earlier criticism, particularly by John Wigmore, is discussed throughout the
Article below.
6 One of the few of the recent scholarly inventories of reasonable-doubt instruc-
tions to consider articulable doubt is Mulrine, supra note 5, at 216-17 (considering
the instruction solely as a matter of Canadian law).
7 The bulk of this work has been done by Barbara Shapiro. See BARBARAJ. SHA-
PIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE: HIsTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE ANGLo-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE" (1991) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, BEVOND
REASONABLE DOUBT]; BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVEN-
TEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATURAL SCI-
ENCE, RELIGION, HIS-rORY, LAW, AND LIr ERATURE (1983) [hereinafter SHAPIRO,
PROBABI rIV]; BarbaraJ. Shapiro "To a Moral Certainty " Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-
American juries 1600-1850, 38 HAS'INcS L.J. 153 (1986) [hereinafter Shapiro, Moral
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this later history upon the criminal law have remained largely unex-
amined. This Article seeks also to correct this omission.
A thorough consideration of the instruction since its inception
reveals deep controversy, marked by four recurring arguments. First
is the role of the juror; or how much independence does the law allow
the juror, when the juror is exercising the seemingly independent
judgment the law demands? In this question is a second, in what man-
ner should the juror think about the evidence, or how can the juror
form knowledge upon which the law will rely? From that flows a third,
at what degree of certainty is the juror obliged to convict, or how thor-
oughly persuaded must the juror be to exercise these judgments?
These three concerns are often seen only in the fourth, more visible
question that arises from them: what language can express any resolu-
tion of the first three arguments, or what shall the juror be told? By
considering the history of reasonable doubt with a concern for all of
these issues, rather than the usual preoccupation with the language
alone, several conclusions arise.
Despite its later prominence as a shield against wrongful convic-
tion, the instruction was not devised to protect more fully the inno-
cent. Rather it was pursued as a means of more easily convicting the
accused. Toward this end, a fundamental purpose of the instruction
was to constrain the juror, to prevent the juror from acting with exces-
sive independence in determining innocence. From such dark begin-
nings, the manner in which these ends have been pursued has been
accelerated in the light of cultural and linguistic shifts, marked espe-
cially by changes in understanding the nature and meaning of "rea-
son." The instruction has moved from a standard incorporating three
elements-a form of non-metaphysical consideration, a form of moral
reasoning, and a measure of sufficiency in the evidence-to being
only a standard of sufficiency.
As a result of these changes, the legal consequences of the in-
struction have changed. Over time, the burden upon the juror who
would acquit has grown, and so the evidence necessary for the state to
convict has lessened. This change in the burden of proof has
profound implications for the prosecutor's burden of persuasion.
The new understanding of reasonable doubt can reverse the opera-
tion of the presumption of innocence.
This Article will consider in six Parts- the evidence from which
these conclusions are drawn:
Certainly]; see also Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasona-
ble Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REv,. 507 (1975).
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Part I examines the juror's role prior to the advent of the reason-
able-doubt instruction. Jurors enjoyed a brief period freed from the
initial fetters of juror liability during which their certainty of guilt was
the sole standard for their conviction of the defendant.
Part II examines the intertwined conceptions of reason, moral
certainty, and doubt. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries, ideas of knowledge gave rise to rival conceptions of certainty,
framed particularly in the writings of John Locke and Bishop John
Wilkins. From these, prosecutors moved deliberately to limit the dis-
cretion of the juror.
Part III examines the development of an articulability standard,
in which reasonable doubt came to mean a doubt that can be stated.
This variant of the standard replaces the concept of "reasonableness"
with the concept of "a reason," with grave consequences for the jury.
Part IV examines the acceptance of the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as a constitutional standard in criminal cases. The
controversies in applying this standard to a range of federal and state
cases illustrate not only the difficulties with the standard in general
but also the increasing use of the articulability standard within the
constitutional framework.
Part V examines the academic concerns raised for a century
against the instruction in general. This argument, particularly raised
by the great evidence writerJohn Henry Wigmore, predated its consti-
tutional acceptance, and its claims are even louder in concert with
recent concerns raised against the fundamental notion that the law
can or should rest on notions of reason, which are considered in Part
VI.
These six Parts are, roughly, chronological. Yet they are predomi-
nately thematic, and there is a certain overlap in time as ideas are
followed when they meander forward and back. The ideas them-
selves, and an effort to draw some conclusions from them, are
presented in Part VII, in which one conclusion is a plea for more care-
ful research, employing the tools of social science to test these
conclusions.
I. BEFORE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: CONVICTION VS. DOUBTS
The early days of the jury are, as they say, shrouded in mystery.,
The first jury probably rendered a decision with simple exactitude: it
8 There are institutions resembling the jury in many ancient cultures, including
the Athens of Solon and the Sweden of the Sagas. The source of its import into
England, at least as early as Ethelbert, is much debated. The jury lost its role in En-
gland with the Norman invasion, being replaced by trials of torture, reputation, com-
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either convicted or it did not. An early oath of the common law juror
is little more than a promise to find the truth: "Hear this ye justices,
that I will speak the truth concerning that which you shall question
me on the king's behalf."9 The move to require jurors to act as inde-
pendent arbiters of claims with which they had no prior knowledge
was an early modern innovation."'
By Edward Coke's time, the role of the common-law juror
was clear and simple: "[flor jurors are to try the fact, and the
judges ought to judge according to the law that riseth upon the
fact."'" In doing so, jurors were to decide the questions of fact
necessary to resolve the case, although they were specifically for-
bidden to attempt to decide the case on issues, usually of law,
that were not within the charge before them.' 2 This unadorn-
bat, and other Norman means to establish guilt, usually before a noble, priest, or
judge. The reintroduction of a precursor to the criminal jury began by the twelfth
century, and the jury was famously required under MAGNA CARTA para. 39 (1215),
which required that no freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned, or dispossessed with-
out the judgment of his peers. See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 537 n.29 (1990). The jury contemplated in the Charters, however,
only anachronistically evokes the modern criminal trialjury. See id. at 538 n.31. For
the medieval development of the criminal jury, see id. at 84-90; THOMAS ANDREW
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING -1O CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL
TRIALJURY, 1200-1800 (1985); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OFJUSTICE: ORIGINS
OF TRIAL BYJURY (1999); and TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY
IN ENGLAND, 1200-1800 U.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988). See alsoWiL
LIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (1878); JOHN PETTINGAL, AN INQUIRY INTO
THE USE OF AND PROTECTION OF JURIES AMONG THE GREEKS AND ROMANS (1769).
9 2 FLETA, bk. 1, ch. 19, at 45 (H.G. Richardson & G.O. Sayles eds. & trans., 72
Selden Soc'y 1995) (1647). This oath would likely have been required for a juror in
what today we would call a civil case, as the oath would have been required at convic-
tion, and not commencement, in criminal cases.
10 See sources cited supra note 7. See generally George Fisher, The Jury's Rise As Lie
Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 585-602 (1997).
11 EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND § 366, at *226a, re-
printed in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE (Steve Sheppard ed,, forth-
coming 2003) (on file with author).
12 Coke's depiction of the role of the juror emphasizes the idea that still domi-
nates rules of evidence, that the jury should only consider matters relevant to this
case:
"[I]n all cases when jurors find the special matter doubtful in law perti-
nent and tending to the issue which they are to try, there the Court ought to
accept it, but when they find matter at large which is not pertinent .... there
the Court ought to disallow it as impertinent to the issue and their charge."
Dowman's Case, 9 Coke Reports 1, 77 Eng. Rep. 743 (KB. 1585). Doubt was also the
discriminant of other procedures affecting the jury. Coke noted that the peers serv-
ing as jurors in a trial of petit treason must "if upon debate whereof they should any
doubt of any matter" and desire to confer with judges, do so in open court before the
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ed view of a juror's obligations persisted into the eighteenth
century.'3
The decision of each juror, the mechanism by which the jurors
would find the matter, was not a question for the law14 but a matter of
private conscience.'15 As a matter of conscience, the juror had to
swear on oath to convict. From at least the late middle ages, "convic-
tion" was the basis of a finding of guilt, and the law was based upon
the jurors' conviction that the prosecutor had proved the facts as-
serted in the accusation. 1
Looking back, it is not easy to discern the degree of proof the
medieval juror expected to support a conviction. Professor John
Langbein has argued that, in the absence of any evidence to deter-
prisoner. Otherwise, the peers continue together "until they are agreed of their ver-
dict." CO'KE, supra note 11. The common law is not utterly consistent in maintaining
the role of jurors as definers of fact alone. The provincial and colonial courts turned
the whole verdict over to the jury, reserving only procedural matters, such as benefit
of clergy, for the bench. See, e.g., Steve Sheppard, Paul Dudley: Heritage, Observation,
and Conscience, 6 MASS. LEGAL His'r. 1, 19-22 (2000).
13 The most influential texts regarding the operation of the jury were the remark-
ably similar, if competing, books of Duncombe and Euer. GILES DUNCOMBE, TRYALS
PER PAlS OR, THE LAW OF ENGLAND CONCERNING JURIES BY Nisi PRIUS (photo. reprint
1980) (1682); SAMSON EUER, TRYALS PER PALS, OR, THE LAW, CONCERNING JURIES BY
NISI-PRIUS (Giles Dumcombe ed., 1986) (1665). Duncombe's was originally published
in 1665, and remained in print into the 1700s, an updated edition being reprinted in
1725 by E. & R. Nutt, and a ninth edition being published in Philadelphia in 1793.
The obligations of thejuror, in language based on Coke, were restated by DUNCOMBE,
supra, at 367-68 and EUER, supra, at 154-55, of finding the facts according to the
evidence.
14 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 333 (1956).
15 See, e.g.,JOIIN HAWLES, THE ENGLISHMAN'S RIGHT: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A BAR-
RISTER AT LAW AND A JURYMAN (Richard Janeway ed., London 1680) (noting among
the benefits of trial byjury that all jurors "must be fully satiqfied in their consciences"
of guilt). Barbara Shapiro has concluded that this approach, the mere requirement
that jurors, particularly in the grand jury, be "satisfied" according to their fully per-
suaded conscience was typical of the writers for a century. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONA-
BLE Doulrr, supra note 7, at 13-18, 263 n.50; see also id. at 22 (citing a counsel's
argument in 1777 at the Old Bailey, that "any room upon the evidence to doubt"
requires a verdict of not guilty). It certainly accords with Chancellor Francis Bacon's
view of scientific certainty. See, e.g., DANIEL R. COQUILLErE, FRANCIS BACON 244-56
(1992) (detailing Bacon's views of certainty in law); Sachiko Kusukawa, Bacon's Classi-
fication of Knowledge in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BACON 46 (Markku Peltonen
ed., 1996).
16 See Act of 7 Hen. 7, c. 21. (1491) ("As though none atteyndour nor conviccion
had ben hadde ageynst the seid William .... ") The earliest entry in the OED for
"convict" as a basis for proof of an offense is a fourteenth-century usage by Wyclif. 3
OXFORD ENGLISH DKrIONARY 879 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "conviction") [hereinafter
OED].
[VOL. 78:41172
THE METAMORPH-OSES OF REASONABLE DOUBT 1173
mine what burden of proof the jurors should accept, "the trial jury
required for condemnation not certainty, but only persuasion" even
though jurors were often not even persuaded by the evidence they
were presented. 17 This conclusion, however, does not sit well with the
equation of the juror's task, which was to "convict." One cannot read
too much into the lexical intersection of conviction and certainty, any
more than one can conclude that the jurors believed that they were
personally convicting someone whom the law itself, or the judges,
convicted.' 
Although it is but a lexical argument, conviction seems more to
be based on certainty than on mere persuasion, and the obligation
upon the juror to find guilt for a conviction thus seems much more to
require certainty than merely to be persuaded to some lesser degree
of confidence. In the absence of any documentary evidence, the dis-
tinction that Langbein accepts that "while certainty is a much harder
standard to satisfy than persuasion, persuasion [was] often difficult
enough to achieve," the acquittals that Langbein notes may in fact
have resulted from a juror expectation of certainty.19
In either event, jurors had the obligation to determine according
to their own satisfaction the truth of the matters brought before them,
and there were no legally required obligations other than that they be
17 JOHN LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 80 (1976) [hereinafter
LANGBEIN, LAW OF PROOF]. It may be that Langbein is not utterly wedded to this view
that the juror need not have been certain to convict. In his earlier work of compara-
tive criminal procedure, he noted that the "jury standard of proof... required that
[the officers of the state] establish certainty." JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME
IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE 206 (1974) [hereinafter LANGBEIN,
PROSECUTING CRIME].
18 The 3 OED, supra note 16, at 878, notes a usage in 1584 in Powel's Lloyd's
Cambria at 387: "No Englishman should be convicted except by English Judges." This
usage, when more fully considered in its use to describe civil cases, illustrates both the
strength and weakness of ascribing the idea of conviction to the action of the juror,
whose verdict was necessary to, but only part of, the conviction. In considering the
application of law in Wales, Powel noted "And if anie sute happened betweene a
Welshman and an Englishman, it, was by law ordeined that the Englishman should
not be convict, unlesse it were by the judgment of English Justices, and by the verdict
of whole English burgesses." THE HISTORIE OF CAMBRIA, Now CALLED WALES
(London, Rafe Newberie & Henrie Denham 1584).
19 LANGBEIN, LAW OF PROOF, supra note 17, at 80 (citing JOEL SAMAHIA, LAW AND
ORDER IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE; THE CASE OF ELIZABETHAN ESSEX (1974); CECIL
L'ESTRANGE EWEN, WITCH HUNTING AND WITCH TRIALS 98-111 (1929), which detail
high acquittal figures in, respectively, witchcraft trials and prosecutions in the Essex
Assizes). The current author's own study of the assize rolls in the Home Counties
agree with the general conclusions that there was a considerably higher rate of acquit-
tal by late medieval juries than one might expect.
200.3)
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willing to swear to the truth of their conclusions. This obligation of
an oath before God likewise suggests that the juror believed in an in-
dependent conviction of the guilt of the accused. Such an obligation
would be unlikely to be met by persuasion to a lesser degree than
certainty.
Thus, once we can find records of more verbose descriptions of
juror instructions, it is not surprising to learn that eighteenth-century
jurors were told if they were doubtful, they should acquit. 2 1 The deci-
sion was left in the unfettered hands of the juror and his "good
sence."
2 1
This degree of lenity in the face of doubt was not always appreci-
ated. In 1785, the influential moralist and priest William Paley railed
against jurors, who through "over-strained scrupulousness, or weak ti-
midity" would "not condemn any man, whilst there exists the minutest
possibility of his innocence." 22 He believed a worthy reform, making
for more convictions, would be for jurors to convict when the "pre-
ponderation of evidence is so manifest as to persuade every private
understanding of the prisoner's guilt; when it furnishes the degree of
credibility upon which men decide and act in all other doubts, and
which experience hath shown that they may decide and act upon with
sufficient safety."23
Paley's proposed standard, vague in so many ways, would have at
least increased the role of doubt as opposed to certainty, a role that he
believed would be important in adopting a standard that would lead
jurors more readily to convict the guilty. A juror who might vote to
20 For examples of instructions, see SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra
note 7, at 266 n.77. Shapiro quotes appropriately from The Trial of Swann (1752), in
which the prosecutor argued that the evidence was "'so strong, so convincing.., that
that Presumption that will rise to a Conviction; there will not remain the least Doubt
of it.'" Id. at 21.
21 See the colonial instructions quoted in WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZA-
TION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPA(TF OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSE-rrS SocI-
ETry, 1760-1830, at 409 (1976). The concept of doubt playeda procedural role as well
as a role in the substance of the decision. Blackstone, following Coke, noted that the
'jury could refer matters in which they were in doubt back to the judge for decision,
only reaching a verdict if they were convinced they should convict or acquit without
committing a hazard to their oaths. 4 WILLIAM BIACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *354; cf
Dowman's Case, 9 Coke Reports 1, 77 Eng. Rep. 743 (K.B. 1585). One manner in
which questions of facts and law were divided was the special verdict, which was voted
for on its particular issues but according to the general standards. See BAKER, supra
note 8, at 95-99.
22 WILLIAM PALE', Moral and Political Philosophy, reprinted in THE WORKS OF WIt-
LIAM PALEY 27, 141 (Philadelphia, J.J. Woodward 1831).
23 Id., reprinted in THE WORKS OF WILLIAM PALEY (Philadelphia, J.J. Woodward
1831).
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acquit must have the same degree of credibility or doubt regarding
the prisoner's guilt as the degree of credibility or doubt that the juror
would use in daily decisions. Clearly, Paley was attracted to his pro-
posed reform with an eye toward its practical consequence, one he
believed would hold the crown to a less rigorous proof of its case.
This could be accomplished by encouraging the jurors to decide the
verdict not by a momentous standard of proof but by comparing their
judgment in the case, and their doubts in the case, with their senses of
judgment and doubt that they ordinarily think are sufficient. Al-
though Paley's argument was one for change, change was slow in com-
ing, and other observers were less troubled by the status quo.
It was still quite appropriate then that Justice James Wilson, in his
law lectures at the College of Philadelphia in 1790, characterized "the
discretionary power vested in juries" by the common law to be the
unadorned "power to try the truth of facts ... by evidence."2 4 Even so,
he found evidence as a basis for proving an historical fact to be so
complex that no scientific rule could assess it. Thus, he claimed that
"the power of deciding on the evidence of facts must be a discretion-
ary power; for it is a power of deciding on a subject unsusceptible to
general principles or rules." 25  The required level of proof was
whether the evidence would be such as "would govern the judgment"
of every person in society, a standard met in part by requiring unanim-
ity in the jury. 26
This standard ofJustice Wilson's is one of the first analyses, if not
the first, to use the standard of proof as a mechanism not only of
measuring the sufficiency of evidence as one person's view of the suffi-
cient but also by assigning to it a measure that must be satisfied uni-
versally. In other words, Wilson makes clear what had been thought
true all along: each juror must privately resolve to determine that the
evidence is so strong that every person would convict upon it. The
standard incorporates, in this way, the burden of persuasion into the
24 2JAMES WILSON, LECTURES ON LxW 306 (1804). Wilson's lecture on thejury, in
eighty-four pages, is one of the few substantial treatments on the subject in his age. It
is one for which he admits, at least on some issues, to having "investigated minutely
and carefully, historically and upon principle." Id. at 349. Wilson and his lectures as.
a whole are described in Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons:
An Introductory Histoy of Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IowA L. REV. 547, 570-71 (1997).
25 2 WILSON, supra note 24, at 310; see also 2 id. at 356.
26 In order to find that agreement, Wilson stated that each juror must decide the
case according to private sentiment, and if all are agreed to convict, the defendant is
convicted. But, he concluded, "If a single sentiment is not for conviction; then the
verdict of acquittal is the immediate consequence." 2 id. at 355. This was a marked
difference from Wilson's view of a civil jury, in which jurors form their sentiments and
"reason together" to a common result. 2 id. at 354-55, 357-60.
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burden of proof. The prosecutor must convince each juror, indepen-
dently, that the evidence would be sufficient for everyone.
Thus stood matters at the dawn of the republic. The jury was
invested with its traditional obligation to try the facts of cases. This
discretion was held in each individual juror, of whom the law ex-
pected care but in whose sentiments the decision resided, with no re-
quirement of justification to anyone but God Almighty. Even so, the
seeds of change had been sown in the ideas of certainty and doubt,
which contributed to a continuing dissatisfaction by prosecutors and
others with the jury's unfettered power. New ideas were arising that
would alter the role of the jury; prosecutors and judges attempting to
contain the power of juries would apply ideas drawn from a rather
unlikely source, philosophers' attempts to understand the nature of
knowledge itself, particularly how one might reconcile belief in God
with skepticism about nature.
II. THE SEVENTEENTH THROUGH THE NINETEENTH CENTURIES: THE
STANDARD ARISES-MORAL CERTAINTY AND
REASONAB.E DOUBT
British philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
was a scene of lively debate on the nature of knowledge and aware-
ness. Radical theological and humanist arguments had arisen to con-
sider new theories of knowledge. Debates over skepticism and
epistemology were common throughout the literate classes, sparked
not only by new thinking from the likes of Francis Bacon, Ren6
Descartes, and Isaac Newton but also by debates among Catholics, An-
glicans, and Puritans. Some of these questions had been tamed by
Thomas Aquinas and Descartes, who, each in his way, had followed
the path of Aristotle in segregating problems of absolute knowledge
from knowledge borne of the senses and reason. From them came
views that mankind might lack the absolute knowledge of the uni-
verse, perhaps known only to God, but that as a thinking being,
human beings can and do know some things, not the least being their
own existences.
A. Moral Certainty
In the midst of these debates, new ideas about certainty, as well as
about the persuasion and sufficiency of evidence, turned often upon
ideas of knowledge in general, claims of reason, and levels of cer-
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tainty, or understandings of probability.2 7 Looking back on these de-
bates, the most important division may have followed the Platonic
fault line between form and reality, a division useful in answering me-
dieval skeptical concerns by dividing theology from worldly doubt.
2 8
There are other forms, of course, of certainty and of doubt that
were open to knowledge by human beings. An idea that was logically
true was derived from definition by logic or mathematics. Thus the
statement that "every effect has a cause" was true because it is a logi-
cally necessary result of the definitions of cause and of effect. Physical
certainty was demonstrable from the evidences of the senses and was
true if there was no sensory evidence to contradict it.
The most important form of certainty, for the purpose of this Ar-
ticle, was "moral certainty," which is the form of certainty that any
person is capable of achieving from an understanding of the nature of
things, applying reason and thought to the testimony of others, along
with personal observation and experience. Moral certainty stood in
contrast to Divine knowledge or metaphysical certainty. This division
was initially important in a world in which the doubts of rational skep-
ticism could arouse the interest of ecclesiastical censors, who could be
assuaged with proofs that the doubts were not of dogma, which re-
mained happily insulated beyond doubt.
The division between moral certainty and other forms of cer-
tainty became widely accepted among the literate classes of England
in the 1600s,29 having been employed by natural scientists, such as
27 See SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY, supra note 7, passim (discussing the intersection of
these ideas in the seventeenth century).
28 There is a rich literature on the epistemological problems that arise in the
conflict between certainty and skepticism, as well as among the various forms and
objects of knowledge that might be justified. For a general history of early modern
skeptic literature, see RICHARD H. POPKIN, THE HISTORY OF SCEPTICISM FROM ERASMUS
TO SPINOZA (1979). The move of emphasizing the division of metaphysics (soon to
include theology) from physics (and all other practical enquiries) was made by Aris-
totle, emphasized by Augustine in his Contra Academicus, and enshrined as dogma by
Aquinas. The history of the early modern debate on these matters, and their some-
what resolution through the developments of statistics and the concept of probability
has been given several recent treatments. See generally IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE
OF PROBABILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUC-
TION AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE (1975); MARY PoovEY, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN
FACT: PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCES OF WEALTH AND SOCIETY (1998); STE-
PHEN M. STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS: THE MEASUREMENT OF UNCERTAINTY
BEFORE 1900 (1986). To locate these debates in early modern England, see the works
of Professor Shapiro, supra note 7, and Roy PORTER, THE CREATION OF THE MODERN
WORLD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE BRITISH ENLIGHTENMENT (2000).
29 See ROBERT BOYLE, SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE RECONCILEABLENESS OF
REASON AND RELIGION (1675), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE ROBERT
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Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke, theologians, such as the Cambridge
neo-Platonists, and philosophers, such as, if rather indirectly, John
Locke."') The use of the idea most significant to the common law,
however, was that by Bishop Wilkins.
B. Bishop Wilkins, Moral Certainty, and Reasonable Doubt
Although he is almost completely unknown today, the influence
of John Wilkins upon his age was considerable. The Warden of Wad-
ham College, Oxford, and the guardian there of intellectual indepen-
dence during the Commonwealth (a task made easier by his marriage
to Oliver Cromwell's sister), Wilkins chaired the meeting to foundthe
Royal Society in 1660 and was its first secretary."' Even if Wilkins was
not as brilliant a thinker as many of his contemporaries, his influence
was vast, and his posthumously released Of the Principles and Duties of
Natural Religion went through several editions. 32 That work not only
established moral certainty as the touchstone for thought and skepti-
cism in matters of disputed historical fact, but also tied it to the notion
of reasonable doubt.
For Wilkins, the very nature of certainty was the same as knowl-
edge. It was "[t]hat kind of Assent which doth arise from such plain
and clear Evidence as doth not admit of any reasonable cause of
BOYLE 182 (Thomas Birch ed., 1772); RALPIH CUDWORTH, THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE: THE FIRST PART: WHEREIN ALL THE REASON AND PHILOSOPHY
OF ATHEISM IS CONFUTED AND ITS IMPOSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATED (1678).
30 SeeJOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 538 (Peter H.
Nidditch ed., 1975) (1690) ("[T]here are different degrees and ways of Evidence and
Certainty."); see also Shapiro, Moral Certainty, supra note 7, at 158 (discussing Locke's
understanding of moral certainty as the highest species of probability).
31 SeeJoHN AUBREY, AUBREY'S BRIEF LIVES 319-20 (Oliver Lawson Dick ed., 1957);
M.JAMIE FERREIRA, SCEIICISM AND REASONABLE DOUBr: THE BRITISii NATURALIST TRA-
DITION IN WILKINS, HUME, REID AND NEWMAN 10, 12 (1986); P.A. WRIGHT HENDERSON,
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOHN WILKINS 90 (1910); MARGERY PARVER & E.J. BOWEN, THE
BEGINNING OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY (1960). Barbara Shapiro, once again, has the out-
standing contribution in the field. See BARBARAJ. SHAI'IROJOHN WILKINS, 1614-1672:
AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (1969).
32 The first edition was published in 1675, three years after Wilkins's death. JOHN
WILKINS, OF THE PRINCIPLES AND DUTIES OF NATURAL RELIGION: To WI-Cl-I Is ADDED, A
SERMON PREACHED AT HIS FUNERALS, BY WILLIAM LLOYD, D.D. (London, A. Maxwell
1675). The work was reprinted in 1683, 1693, 1699, 1710, and 1734, as well as in his
collected works in 1707. W. GRIMME-1r, THE MATHEMATICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
WORKS OF THE RIGH-r REVEREND JOHN WILKINS, LATE LORD BIsHOP OF CHESTER TO
WHICHI IS PREFiX'D TiE AUTiiOR'S LIFE, AND AN ACCOUNT OF HIS WORKS (London, J.
Nicholson et al. eds. 1707).
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doubting."3 3 Certainty was distinguished from matters of opinion and
probability and divided into three categories: physical, mathematical,
and moral. All of these forms of certainty could arise from self-evi-
dent understanding, from first principles that cannot be proved from
inference, or from deduction. Matters fit for moral certainty were less
perfectly provable than physical and mathematical certainty.
I call that Moral Certainty, which hath for its object such Beings as
are less simple, and do more depend upon mixed circumstances.
Which though they are not capable of the same kind of Evidence
[as mathematical and physical matters] so as to necessitate every
man's Assent, though his judgment be never so much prejudiced
against them; yet they may be so plain that every man whose judg-
ment is free from prejudice will consent unto them. And though
there be no natural necessity, that such things must be so, and that
they cannot possibly be otherwise, without implying a contradiction,
yet may they be so certain as not to admit of any reasonable doubt
concerning them.3
4
Wilkins asserted that moral certainty of a conclusion could result
from considering three forms of evidence: evidence arising from the
nature of things,3 -5 evidence from testimony, and the evidence of per-
sonal experience.
36
Wilkins's influential notion of moral certainty therefore incorpo-
rated three elements: the domains of consideration (the practical
world not provable by faith or mathematics), the form of thought
(reasoned and, we may infer, without conscious prejudgment), and
the sources of evidence (the nature of things, testimony, and experi-
ence). It also dictated a level of confidence in the evidence.
Its measurement depended, however, on a sufficiency of evidence
or confidence in the evidence, because a matter of moral certainty
had to be so certain that no one without a prejudice would dissent
33 JOHN WILKINS, OF THE PRINCIPLES AND DUTIES OF NATURAL RELIGION 7-8 (Rich-
ard H. Popkin ed., 1969) (1693).
34 Id. at 7-9.
35 As examples of knowledge derived from the nature of things, Wilkins offered
several propositions. One of these seems to the modern mind to be uncontroversial:
"that a Mind free from passion and prejudice, is more fit to pass a true judgment, than such a
one as is byassed with affections and interests." Id. at 9-10. Others, however, are more
contingent on the views of the time, although probably they are only academically
controversial today: "That there are such things as Vertue and Vice. That Mankind is natu-
rally designed for a sociable life." Id. at 10.
36 Wilkins offered as examples that he was morally certain from testimony alone
to be morally certain that there had been such a person as Queen Elizabeth and such
a place as Spain, and from his experience had no reason to doubt that the house he
was in should not fall upon him the next second. Id.
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from it. At a lesser degree of confidence arising from the same evi-
dence, Wilkins found not moral certainty but only opinion and
probability. 3 7 Thus, Wilkins believed that when evidence for a point is
less than that which would necessitate every unprejudiced person's as-
sent, the point was, as he put it, a matter of reasonable doubt..8
This last point suggests one essential requirement for moral cer-
tainty: a reasonable person was capable of moral certainty. While his
illustration of moral certainty includes a passage that proclaims a true
judge to be one not "bypassed with affections and interests,"s the na-
ture of the bias Bishop Wilkins had in mind is not necessarily clear to
the modern reader. Beyond the obvious problem of someone unfairly
prejudging an issue on a basis other than according to the nature of a
thing, an implied requirement would have been that the person was
sufficiently sane to become certain and to avoid prejudice. It might
also have excluded Roman Catholics and others whose religious con-
viction or creeds were perceived by the state to demand
prejudgment.411
Lastly, and in the context of legal judgment perhaps most tell-
ingly, is the double meaning of Wilkins's understanding of the moral
element of moraljudgment. While one might, as we have so far, read
the moral element as strictly a neutral concept related to practical ac-
tion, one might also read it as an ethical concept related to judgments
of right and wrong. Clearly, Wilkins implied both readings, and his
illustrations, that unprejudiced judgment is good, that there are Vir-
tue and Vice, and that humans are sociable creatures, are related to
both forms of moral certainty.4'
C. Moral Certainty and the Law
Although moral certainty would confuse later generations, the
lawyers of the seventeenth century lived in the light of a general ac-
37 Id. at 10-11. This approach was followed by Locke. LoCKE, supra note 30, at
657-58. Locke converted Wilkins's notion of universal assent from "moral certainty"
to "the highest degree of probability." Locke elaborated Wilkins's view rather di-
rectly. See id. at 663-64.
38 See FERREIRA, supra note 31, at 15 (noting that other authors of the period
"refuse[d] to equate unreasonable doubt with impossible doubt"); WILKINS, supra
note 33, at 7-11 (discussing Wilkins's distinction between reasonable and unreitsona-
ble doubt).
39 WILKINS, supra note 33, at 10.
40 See Theodore Waldman, Origins of the Legal Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt, 20 J.
HIST. IDEAS 299, 301 & n.10 (1959) (comparing Wilkins's discussion to the views of
William Chillingworth andJohn Tillotson).
41 WILKINS, supra note 33, at 10.
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ceptance of Bishop Wilkins's approach. To them, discussing ajuror's
confidence in a verdict in such terms involved no more than a refine-
ment of their form of talk.42 There is no evidence that requirements
of moral certainty would have been meant to alter the way in which
jurors reached their beliefs. It was merely an addition by the educated
to their description of what the juror would do, and had in fact been
doing. Further, it was not necessarily used with great precision or
consistency.
Moral certainty and its correlative forms of doubt were already
accepted forms of discourse in the religious treason trials of the Resto-
ration. In Lord Stafford's trial of 1680, prosecutors argued to the En-
glish Lords as a jury that, while they had already produced
"presumptive evidence which will induce a moral persuasion," the
prosecutors would further produce "such positive Evidence as will
make a judicial certainty; and will abundantly suffice to convince your
Lordships and convict this Lord."43
This interesting juxtaposition equated "moral persuasion" with
'judicial certainty," suggesting that either element might constitute
moral certainty. Clearly they reflect the requirements for which Wil-
kins had promoted moral certainty-an amount of testimony, in the
light of personal knowledge and experience, that could persuade a
person who must judge that the basis for the judgment was beyond
doubt. Even the last element, that the judgment was beyond doubt,
was in the prosecutors' minds. They summed up their case with the
assertion that the evidence was "so strong that . . . it admits of no
doubt. 44
Moral certainty entered the common law in the young United
States with some ease. In 1795, the Connecticut Superior Court re-
versed a justice of the peace's conviction for disturbing the peace
without a finding of guilt by moral certainty.45 In one of the treason
trials related to the Burr conspiracy, the U.S. Attorney General argued
that the ease that Aaron Burr predicted he would have in raising
troops gave rise to a moral certainty that he had already raised some. 46
In other words, proof of an effect gave rise to a moral certainty of a
necessary cause.
42 See Shapiro, Moral Certainty, supra note 7, at 162-68 (discussing the seven-
teenth-century use of the "satisfied conscience" as a precursor to "reasonable doubt,"
in which the juror's moral certainty is associated with their oath).
43 THE TRYAL OF WILLIAM VISCOUNT STAFFORD FOR HIGHi TREASON 40-41 (London,
John Bill, Thomas Newcomb, & Henry Hills 1680).
44 Id. at 186.
45 Knowles v. State, 2 Root 282 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1795).
46 Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 115-16 (1807).
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In a classic example of the expectation of the juror to act on the
basis of moral certainty, 47 in 1838 Francis Lieber depicted the juror's
task as resting solely on the demand that the juror apply a legal stan-
dard of moral certainty based on a social obligation-both to find the
truth from the evidence in the case and to apply the law governing the
crime alleged. Lieber was careful to distinguish away the idea that the
juror must be "morally convinced" of innocence. The jury had no
requirement of ascertaining innocence. On the other hand, im-
pliedly, the jurors had a requirement to find guilt, if they could find it
by a moral certainty.
The juror, as he is always instructed to do, must judge by the evi-
dence which is brought before him, and nowise by the capricious im-
pression which he may have received elsewhere. Respecting this
point, he must remember that the words of the verdict "not guilty" are
not of absolute import, but have a legal meaning; that is, the jury, in
delivering the verdict, does not mean to say, "We absolutely declare
the prisoner at the bar not guilty," nor even that they are morally con-
vinced of his innocence. All that a verdict of not guilty can mean is
this:
[a]ccording to the distinct rules of law and the evidence as now laid
before us in the course of the trial, the prisoner cannot in the sense
of the law, according to such application of it as society demands, be
called guilty; or, in other words, according to those rules which soci-
ety wills us strictly to obey in judging of the prisoner, he has not
been proved guilty. 48
There is no way, at this remove, to know how well the idea of
"moral certainty" translated across the often wide division in literacy
and class between the lawyers and their lay juror counterparts. One
might conjecture that the increasingly diverse venire pool led to an
increased difference between the understanding of lawyer and lay ju-
ror on a host of fronts. Only one of these differences was the loss of a
47 This example is, of course, written well into the nineteenth century, but it may
well be significant to note that this late depiction of the role of the juror makes no
mention of reasonableness or reasonable doubt. Although there are earlier exam-
ples, Shapiro notes a good early example of the use of moral certainty in the law in
MAYIrIEw HALE, THE PRIMrIVE ORIGINATION OF MANKIND 129 (1677), quoted in SHA-
PIRO, PROBABILrIY, supra note 7, at 97-98 (discussing that historical facts, which can-
not be known by the senses must be discovered by "moral evidence" and not
"demonstrative or infallible" knowledge).
48 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHIcs 407 (Theodore D. Woolsey ed.,
1875). Lieber was then a professor of law in the University of South Carolina; he
would later move to Columbia Law School. His surprisingly influential career is de-
scribed in FRANK BURT FREIDEL, FRANCIS LIEBER: NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERAL (1947);
and LEwis R. HALI', FRANCIS LIEBER: HIS LIFE AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1899).
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common understanding of epistemological niceties, thus exposing ju-
rors to increasingly greater confusion over the notion of "moral
certainty."
Regardless of such concerns, moral certainty was the mainstay of
juror's obligations for much of the century.49 Notoriously, it persisted
in some jurisdictions, most importantly California, into the 1990s. 51,
In the end, the notion of moral certainty is quite simple, al-
though with its rationale having evaporated, the term has simply
lapsed into disuse and been replaced by other tokens. Modern West-
ern culture is notoriously skeptical about many of its older certitudes.
The once-raging debates about the nature of God have subsided into
a combination of tolerance, agnosticism, and atheism. The need to
hive off questions of traditional faith from questions more apparent to
us in our everyday lives is less clear, and "moral certainty" became
little more than a synonym for "certainty" in the twentieth century. In
other words, for a writer in 1800 to claim, "I am morally certain,"
roughly equates to my saying two centuries later, "I am as certain as I
can be, based on what I have seen and heard."
D. Reasonableness of the Juror's Doubts
Initially, "reasonable" as a qualification to thought and to jurors'
doubts may have been as benign a change as the introduction of
"moral certainty," with which it shares many common origins. In
short order, though, a requirement to find certainty beyond a reason-
able doubt became a significant restriction on the independent discre-
tion of the individual juror, a change prompted rather deliberately by
prosecutors.
The Age of Reason was a time of tremendous social, technologi-
cal, and philosophical change, and in the seventeenth century, the
ideal of reason became the measure of sound, practical judgment. Of
writers in this vein, the most influential in England was John Locke,
who wrote of conscience and belief as matters of reason, which would
49 See, e.g., Mose v. State, 36 Ala. 211, 231 (1860) (noting that "[u]nless the jury
are morally certain of the defendant's guilt, it cannot be said that they have no rea-
sonable doubt of his guilt"); State v. Miller, 32 A. 137, 141 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1892) (not-
ing that "[m]atters of fact are required to be proved merely to a moral certainty");
Parrish v. State 15 N.W. 357, 360 (Neb. 1883) (upholding jury instruction that
"[m] orally satisfactory and convincing" proof satisfies the law); Smith v. State, 10 Tex.
App. 420, 421 (1881) (noting that a conviction mandates moral certainty in the
proof).
50 See infra note 223.
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support categories of knowledge and of certainty.5' Locke's view that
reason can form the basis for probability and certainty provoked a
bitter dispute between two great Scots, David Hume and Thomas
Reid. Hume argued for an unrelieved skepticism in determining both
the role of reason in judgment and the nature of human knowledge. 52
Reid, the leader of the school of common-sense thought, argued that
far from being the object of skepticism, 'Judging is an operation of
the mind so familiar to every man who hath understanding, and its
name is so common and so well understood, that it needs no defini-
tion. '5 3 Very simply, lawyers of the late eighteenth century, attracted
to the certitude (or appearance of certitude) in such a pragmatic vi-
sion, were drawn to a position much nearer to Reid's.5 4
51 Locke famously asserted three categories of our sources of knowledge-intui-
tion, demonstration, and sensation-which formed the basis for probabilities of cer-
tainty. Locke explains a universal intuition as a propositions that "border so near
upon Certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them." LOCKE, supra note 30, at
655. Personal experience that is in agreement with the experience of others is the
basis of "confidence." Id.
The concurrent testimony of reliable witnesses who agree on a matter makes as-
sent "unavoidable." Id. at 659. All of these lead to a progression of assent, ranging
down through "belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief, etc." Id.
at 661-64. Assent was a component of judgment. i. at 686-87.
52 See DAvID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCFRNINU: HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CON-
CIRNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press 1975)
(1777).
53 THOMAs RIn lO, THOMAS REID'S INQUIRY AND ESSAYS 251 (Keith Lehrer & Ronald
E. Beanblossom eds., 1975).
54 See THOMAs REID, ESSAYS ON THE INIELLECTUAL AND ACrIVE POWERS OF MAN
(1793). In this context, Reid's greatest contribution may have been in his discussion
of contingent truths, particularly his arguments for reliance on hulnan faculties of
sense. Not all lawyers, of course, followed Reid's path, as will be seen below in the
consideration of Chief Justice Shaw's views incorporating more complex ideas. More-
over, the Scottish bar, of which Hume was a leading member, moved in a different
direction, one that included the Scots' verdict of "not proven." There were, to be
certain, a variety of views of the gauge of certainty that could be afforded to evidence.
The most compelling in today's intellectual climate probably would remain that of
Jeremy Bentham, who, considering the complex morass of probabilities and presump-
tions with which the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century law judged proof, rejected
all intermittent limits seeking to define the scale of probativity of evidence or suffi-
cient persuasion for a judge. Rather, he argued for allowing evidence to the highest
level or persuasion, measured against an ideal of an "infinite scale." I JEREMY BEN-
THAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE .100-06 (London, Hunt & Clarke 1827). All
of these approaches were meant to reform a process grown hidebound by a slavish
reliance on pleading. William Twining presents a superb discussion of Bentham's
efforts at evidentiary reform through rationalism. See WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF
EVIDENCE: BENTIAM & WIGMORE (1985).
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"Reasonableness," of course, antedates by centuries the war be-
tween Hume and Reid. The word evolved early in the English lan-
guage, representing at least three fundamentally distinct, but related,
notions: the endowment of reason, the capacity for judgment, and the
ability of rational discourse. 55 The interplay among these different
meanings, and varying emphases among them, is an essential part of
both the word's history and its increasingly confusing role in law.
This interplay also aided the use of reason in increasing the mo-
nopoly of lawyers over legal decisions by emphasizing the artificial na-
ture of the reason employed in legal analysis. In one of its most
celebrated instances, Sir Edward Coke employed "common right and
reason" as the sine qua non for assessing the powers of Parliament.56
And yet, this common reason was part and parcel of the "artificial
reason of the law," which could not easily be understood, much less
employed by anyone who was not schooled in the precedents and
methods of legal argument.57 Granted, this use of reason-effectively
as a synonym for the law itself-was still limited to determine the rea-
son that was in the law, and not reasonableness in the judgment of
jurors.58 Reason, that is, legal reason as opposed to natural reason-
was the tool of a hegemonic move by the officials of law to establish
sole authority over certain types of decision in the law.
Beyond this dispute in the nature of law, however, concern per-
sisted over the role of reason in judgment, the natural reason con-
trasted to artificial legal reason. 59 In general, the prime requirement
55 The OED cites Chaucer's fourteenth-century usages, among others, for all
three points. 8 OED, supra note 16, at 291.
56 Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Reports 212 (1608), reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRIr-
INGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 1I.
57 See Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Coke's Reports 63 (1609), reprinted in I THE SE-
LECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 11.
58 The most important medieval use of reasonableness in the common law was to
describe the portion of an estate taken by a widow and children, the reasonable part,
described in 9 Hen. 3 c. 18. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *492; EDWARD
COKE, SECOND INSTITUTE OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 33, in 2 THE SELECTED WRITIN(.;S
OF SIR EDWARD COKE, suprla note I 1. This use of reasonable, a translation of ration-
alibus incorporated both the ideas of fairness and meetness, but it was a very technical
application and rather far from the lay judgment required of the juror.
59 Coke contrasted James I's abilities as someone with natural reason with some-
one with the reason necessary to adjudge law cases. On the one hand, "true it was,
that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent science and great endowments of
nature," but on the other, "his Majesty was not learned in the Lawes of Realm of
England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or forttlnes of
his Subjects; they are not to be decided by naturall Reason but by the artificiall Rea-
son and judgement of the law." 2 THE SELEC T-ED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, Supra
note 1I.
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of reason in the process ofjudgment was, in the seventeenth century,
that a judgment should be made by a reasonable arbiter. It was not
based on rationality, but on a certitude that a reasonable person could
achieve."0" Accordingly, reasonable doubt was, by definition, merely a
doubt held by a reasonable person.6 1 The idea of the reasonable per-
son was, itself, just then taking hold of the legal imagination.62
Colonial courts found reasonableness in the judicial lexicon de-
cades before it was to be employed to qualify doubt before the jury.63
Reasonableness was an important qualification for the satisfaction of
legal obligations." 4 It was also an important qualification for both le-
gal instruments and agreements65 and judicial acts, especially in the
construction of liability"6 and of private instruments such as wills
67
60 Hill, supra note 1, at 245-47.
61 WALTER CHARLETON, THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL DEMONSTRATED BY
THE LIGHT OF NATURE 186-87 (London, William Wilson 1659) (discussing establish-
ment of the "truth" of the soul's immortality "in the mind of a reasonable man");
SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY, supra note 7, at 33 (citing CHARLES WOLSELEY, TI-E UNREASON-
A13LENES OF ATHEISM MADE MANIFEST 147 (3d ed. 1675) and stating if "testimony was
sufficient to 'satisfie a rational man,' moral certititude was possible"); WILKINS, supra
note 33, at 5 (noting that assent derived "from such plain and clear evidence as doth
not admit of any reasonable cause of douting, is called knowledge of certainty").
62 See BAKER, supra note 8, at 342-48 (citing, inter alia, FRANCIS BULLER, INTRO-
DUCTION OF THE LAW RFLATInF TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS (1768); and WILLIAM JONES,
ESSAY ON TrE LAw OF BAILMENTS 6 (Dublin, Printed for Elizabeth Watts 1781)). Of
course, the idea of reasonableness as a distinctive element of a belief held by thought-
ful people had broader appeal than the law, as we have seen from Bishop Wilkins's
approach. Reasonableness as a basis for Christian belief was central not just to Wil-
kins, though. SeeJOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHIRISTIANITY (Ian T. Ramsey
ed., Stanford Univ. Press 1958) (1695).
63 On the development of the jury in colonial courts, see generally BRADLEY CHA-
PIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606-1660, at 40-50 (1983); and EDGAR
J. MGMANuS, LAW AND LIBE.RTY IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND DUE
PROCESS, 1620-1692, at 98-111 (1993).
64 See, e.g., Dulany v. Jenings, I H. & McH. 92, 92 (Md. Ch. Ct. 1738) (noticing
Proprietor Lord Baltimore's 1684 edict that claims to land patents are not barred by a
strict time but by a reasonable time); Davis v. Richmond, 14 Mass. 473, 474 (1768)
(holding that the sheriff was ordered to deliver debtor's lands and property at reason-
able price).
65 See Gresham v. Gassaway, I H. & McH. 34, 34 (Md. Prov. Ct. 1718) (holding
that sheriff's bond from undersheriff was conditioned on "reasonable request" for
execution of instruments).
66 See, e.g., Brown v. Cornwell, 1 Root 60, 60 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1773) (holding
that the owner of ship's cargo required to contribute for loss to owner of stock ani-
mals lost at sea in storm because, "when the stock upon deck is thrown overboard for
the express purpose of saving from destruction the cargo in the hole, it is but reason-
able that the cargo saved should bear a proportion of the loss, which was the price of
its ransom"); Graves v. Boyd, I Va. Colonial Dec. R45, R45 (Gen. Ct. 1730) (stating
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and leases."" William Blackstone enshrined Coke's articulation of rea-
sonableness binding the extent of custom.6 9 Of course, reasonable-
ness could rarely overwhelm the clear dictates of a common-law rule,
which were each expected to themselves be reasonable.7 11
After independence, reasonableness remained a test of private li-
ability.7' It also quickly became a tool in the interpretation of statu-
tory instruments, 72 treaties, 73 judicial powers,74 and constitutional
duties. 75 Reasonable doubt, indeed, has continued to play a role in
that the chancellor will consider contingent reasonableness of a bargain before en-
forcing contract).
67 See, e.g., Tazewell v. Harmanson, 2 Va. Colonial Dec. B147, B148 (Gen. Ct.
1741) (more reasonable construction of will provision is preferable).
68 See, e.g., Norris's Lessee v. Pottee, 4 H. & McH..508 (Md. Prov. Ct. 1768) (hold-
ing that in a lease construction, "[t]he law will make such a reasonable intendment
upon the whole, as will restrain the general words from affecting Preston by his war-
ranty, which was never intended or thought of by the parties"); Booth v. Dudley, 1 Va.
Colonial Dec. RIO, RI 1 (Gen. Ct. 1729) (holding that preferred construction of lease
was one that was reasonable and grammatical).
69 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *77-78 (discussing reason's limit upon
ctfstom).
70 See, e.g., Brock v. Lyne, 2 Va. Colonial Dec. B111 (Gen. Ct. 1740) (holding that
effect of rules of succession in tail do not depend on reasonableness of the results);
see also the later case of Picket v. Dowdall, 2 Va. 106 (1795). Blackstone, in the intro-
ductory sections to his great Commentaries, noted that the law operated as authority so
to bar independent assessment of the law's reasonableness. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
21, at *44. Furthermore, Blackstone rejected Coke's edict that statutes contrary to
reason are unenforceable. 1 id. at *91.
71 72 See Freary v. Cooke, 14 Mass. 488 (1779) (holding that the custom awarding
a one-season monopoly of a seine fishing site to the person who clears it is unreasona-
ble and void).
72 See Gustin v. Brattle, I Kirby 299 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787) (holding that a rea-
sonable construction is preferable to a strict construction of statute creating savings
for disabilities to suit for defendants out of the country for commercial reasons); In-
gles v. Bringhurst, 1 U.S. (1 Dal.) 367, 370-71 (Ct. C.P. Phila. 1788) (holding that
statute providing permanent lien for common wall is a "a reasonable and useful regu-
lation, calculated to prevent animosities and disputes").
73 See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 249 (1796) (Patterson, J.) (noting
reasonableness is one consideration in determination the intention of parties).
74 See Gilbert v. Marcy, I Kirby 401 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1788) (illustrating that with-
out a statute, court may enforce reasonable requirement to keep criminal prosecution
in district of the crime).
75 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Posey, 8 Va. (4 Call) 109, 126 (1787). In Posey, the
court questioned,
And is it not reasonable that the same view of the official oath should be
taken by a legislator, acting under the constitution, which is his guide, as is
taken by ajudge, acting under the law, which is his? There is in fact and in
common understanding, a necessity of regarding a course of practice, as
above characterized, in the light of a legal rule of interpreting a law: and
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constructing the standards of constitutional sufficiency. Despite its
failure to achieve prominence as a test under the federal constitu-
tion,7 6 it has remained a standard of state review of fit between a stat-
ute and a constitution. 77
there is a like necessity of considering it a constitutional rule of interpreting
a constitution.
Id.
76 See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827) (Washington,J.), in
whichJustice Bushrod Washington used reasonable doubt in two different senses in as
many breaths:
It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism
of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to prestme in favour of its
validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable
doubt. This has always been the language of this Court, when that subject
has called for its decision; and I know that it expresses the honest sentiments
of each and every member of this bench. I am perfectly satisfied that it is
entertained by those of them from whom it is the misfortune of the majority
of the Court to differ on the present occasion, and that they feel no reasona-
ble doubt of the correctness of the conclusion to which their best judgment
has conducted them.
Id. This test for constitutional validity, in lieu of a finding of "repugnance" or other
failures of fit, did not catch on, perhaps because Chief Justice Marshall dissented in
Ogden, clearly preferring a less laden test:
It is well known that the Court has been divided in opinion on this case.
Three Judges, Mr. Justice Duvall, Mr. Justice Story, and myself, do not
concur in the judgment which has been pronounced. We have taken a dif-
ferent view .....
The single question for consideration, is, whether the act of the State of
New-York is consistent with or repugnant to the constitution of the United
States?
Id. at 332. (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). Despite its use in state courts, see infra note 77,
this standard appears only once later to have been argued to the Court, in Northwest-
ern University v. People ex rel. Mille; 99 U.S. 309 (1878), although no discussion of the
putative standard was reached in the opinion by Justice Miller.
77 See, e.g., Rich v. Flanders, 39 N.H. 304 (1859) (deciding the constitutionality of
a retrospective law using a beyond-all-reasonable-doubt standard); McMillen v. Boyles,
6 Iowa (Clarke) 304 (1858) (employing reasonable-doubt language in analysis of a
state statute). Many state courts applied this test to uphold statutes. Some courts
applied it with more moderate deference, including one of the most influential state
cases, In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87 (1834). In considering the question
whether a state enclosure act was constitutional, Chief Justice Shaw thought it "not
improper to repeat what has been so often suggested by courts of justice, that ...
courts... never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity of the act are
placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt." i. at 95. Such a standard of
care was balanced, though, by constitutional policies expressed in one tremendous
sentence:
Still however it cannot be doubted, and I believe it is nowhere denied, that
in a limited government like ours, acting tinder a written constitution with
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So it is no surprise that in the eighteenth century, the idea of
"reasonable" took on more specific meanings in the context of a ju-
ror's duty. The first major importation of the new view of reason to
the law of criminal evidence was in Baron Geoffrey Gilbert's mid-
eighteenth-century Evidence, which was essentially the first treatise in
numerous and detailed provisions, a constitution which is in itself perpetual
and irrepealable except by the people themselves, and which imposes many
restraints upon the power of the legislature by express provisions and many
others by necessary implication, and where the same constitution has pro-
vided for the establishment of ajudiciary as a coordinate department of the
government, with power in all cases to expound the laws, to declare what has
and what has not the force of law, and to apply them to the investigation and
adjustment of the rights, duties, and obligations of citizens, in the actual
administration of justice, it is clearly within the power, and sometimes the
imperative duty of courts, to declare that a particular enactment is not war-
ranted by the power vested in the legislature, and therefore to the extent, to
which it thus exceeds the power of the legislature, it is without efficacy, inop-
erative, and void. The upshot of this balance was to support the require-
ments of standing to challenge a statute and a rebuttable presumption in
favor of constitutionality.
Id. at 95-96. The test of a statute's constitutionality did not always follow this formula.
For example, the Alabama Supreme Court, shortly before the American Civil War,
rejected such a stringent deference to its state legislature:
On the measure of proof necessary to set aside a statute as unconstitutional,
the language of the adjudged cases varies. In some cases it is said, that the
expressed will of the legislature ought not to be disregarded, unless the un-
constitutionality be clearly demonstrated. In another case it is said, that we
should not hold that the legislature had exceeded its power, except in cases
admitting of no reasonable doubt .... With due respect, we think this lan-
guage entirely too strong. It indulges, in favor of legislative infallibility, the
same strength of presumption as that which obtains in favor of innocence
when the life or liberty of the citizen is jeoparded in the courts of criminal
jurisdiction. Constitutional provisions are intended as a protection to life,
liberty and property, against encroachment, intentional or otherwise, at the
hands of the government. Had not the framers of our system of government
supposed it possible that legislative bodies might fall into error, they would
not, in their sovereign capacity, have adopted a written constitution, supe-
rior alike over themselves and the liegislature. We cannot believe that con-
struction a sound one, which indulges every reasonable presumption against
the citizen, when the legislature deals with his rights, and gives him the ben-
efit of every reasonable doubt, when his life and liberty are in jeopardy
before the courts of the country.
Moore v. Wright & Rice, 34 Ala. 311, 321 (1859) (Stone,J.) (citations omitted). Com-
pounding the role of reasonable doubt in statutory interpretation, it was also a gauge
of the ambiguity of a statute. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9, 80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1839) (Nelson, C.J.) (holding that statutory meaning subject to reasonable doubt
must not be overturned unless the legislature clearly oversteps its bounds).
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the field.78 An often garbled twist on the Lockean approach, Gilbert
required that facts be proved by best evidence, that the law recognize
that each person has a separate intuition, and that ajuror confronted
with moral evidence must decide if the juror's judgment "equally ac-
quiesces therein as on a knowledge by Demonstration, for it cannot
have any more Reason to be doubted than if we ourselves had heard
and seen it.'79 The reader is left to personal initiative to understand
it.
The earliest use of the idea that the jury is expected to find guilt
if it considers the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt appears to
have been a few years after the appearance of Gilbert's book. The first
record of it now known was in the trials of British soldiers who killed
five colonists at the Boston Massacre. 811 Two trials arose from the
shootings, one of the captain, in Rex v. Preston,81 and one of the eight
soldiers, Rex v. Wemms.82
John Adams and Josiah Quincy appeared for the defense. At
least in Wemms, of which we have a fuller record,83  Adams argued that
78 GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1756) [hereinafter GILBERT, EVI-
DENCE]. The first edition, in 1754, had been printed in Dublin, a corrected and en-
larged 1756 edition being the first in London. There would be many later editions of
the treatise. Gilbert had already acquired a reputation as a scholar in the field thanks
to his continuation of Nelson's case collections in evidence. See GEOFFREY GILBERT,
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1769).
79 GILBERT, EVIDENCE, supra note 78, at 4. A later edition edited by Capel Lofft
has an added footnote, ascribing this view to David Hartley, John Locke, Richard
Price, John Watts, and John Wilkins. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE In
(Capel Lofft ed., 1795). Gilbert was a devoted fan of Locke's theories, even if they
apparently confused him, as witnessed by Gilbert's unusual employment of the idea of
intuition. Gilbert published a monograph on Locke's theory. See GEOFFREY GILBERT,
AN ABSTRACT OF MR. LOCKE'S ESSAY ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Capel Lofft, ed. Dub-
lin 1795) (1752).
80 The first discussion of the Boston Massacre cases in this light was in Morano,
supra note 7, at 508. Until 1975, the consensus was that the instruction began life
much later, in the Irish treason trials of the 1790s. See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2497, at 464 (2d ed. 1923) [hereinafter WIGMORE, EVIDENCE]; John Wilder May,
Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 Am. L. REV. 642,
657-58 (1876) (discussing use of a reasonable-doubt standard in Irish treason cases).
The current author has yet to find such a clear usage of the standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt prior to Rex v. Preston and Rex v. Wemms.
81 See 3 LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS 46-98 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel
eds., 1965) (providing minutes, notes, and summaries of these cases) [hereinafter
LEGAL PAPERS OF ADAMS].
82 Id. at 98-314.
83 Adams likely made a similar closing in Preston; he is thought to have argued
from the same authorities in each trial. Id. at 242 n.180.
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Chief Justice Hale had rightly described the traditional view of the
juror's duty in doubt: "Where you are doubtful never act; that is, if you
doubt the prisoner's guilt, never declare him guilty; this is always the
rule, especially in cases of life."'8 4 Adams argued that the jury should
apply that rule and not convict if the juror has doubts.
The prosecutor, however, argued that John Adams's view was not
enough. Robert Treat Paine, arguing as crown prosecutor, told the
jurors that the mercy of the law was in its reason, agreeing with Adams
insofar as that the law would not admit as certain an argument of
which there was a doubt. But he made this qualification:
[i]f therefore in the examination of this Cause the Evidence is not
sufficient to Convince you beyond reasonable Doubt of the Guilt of
all or any of the Prisoners by the Benignity and Reason of the Law
you will acquit them, but if the Evidence be sufficient to convince
you of their Guilt beyond reasonable Doubt the Justice of the Law
will require you to declare them Guilty and the Benignity of the Law
will be satisfyed in the fairness and impartiality of their Tiyal. 85
The jury acquitted six and found two guilty of manslaughter.8 "
The two scholars who have considered the significance of the in-
structions in the case, Anthony Morano and Barbara Shapiro, disagree
as to their intended effect, particularly as to whether the requirement
of reasonableness was meant to limit the degree of doubt that should
require acquittal. Professor Shapiro, a historian, considered modifica-
tion by reasonableness to be a natural application of the perceived
advances of thinking and no real departure from the earlier standard
of conscience or doubt.8 7 Professor Morano, a lawyer, maintained
that the reasonable-doubt rule "had the effect of reducing the prose-
cutor's burden of proof in criminal trials."88 As a reason for prosecu-
tors to seek such a rule, Morano noted that new rules of evidence had
then not only recently allowed the defendant to produce exculpatory
evidence but restricted the material the prosecution could present,
making more difficult the proof of a case beyond all doubt.8 9 To this
one might add the recently won freedom ofjurors from the danger of
fine or imprisonment for finding a verdict against the state,9 ° as well
84 Id. at 243.
85 Id. at 271.
86 Id. at 17-22.
87 SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DouBT, supra note 7, at 20-22.
88 Morano, supra note 7, at 514.
89 Id.
90 The watershed for juror independence in judgment, freeing them from a
threat of arrest for misprision should they not convict, is Bushel's Case, 124 Eng. Rep.
1006, 1012 (K.B. 1670). See GREEN, supra note 8, at 200 (discussing Bushel's Case).
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as the defense's right to counsel, just recently won in the colonies and
still unknown in England, 1' and a generally growing mistrust by the
landed classes of the increasingly petit bourgeois juries. 2 Given that we
have yet to discover a record of Robert Treat Paine's preparation for
the trial, there is room for speculation as to the prosecutor's actual
intentions.
Regardless, there is no other reason why the hypotheses of Profes-
sors Shapiro and Morano might not both be correct in part. The in-
struction both accords with the new language of the times and
contrasts with the language of the defense, to the benefit of the state
injury deliberations"'3 Thus, we may fairly conclude that the prosecu-
tor's use of the argument both was designed subtly to help the prose-
cution's case but accorded with contemporary views about the nature
of judgment.94
91 See 2 ZEIIANIAIA Swif-r, A SYSTEM OF 'I'HE LAWS OF TH-IE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
398-99 (1795-1796) ("We have never admitted that cruel and illiberal principle of
the common Law of England that when a man is on trial for his life, he shall be
refused counsel ...."). Justice Sutherland, reviewing the English refusal of counsel to
defendants, summarized the colonial American view of the English rule:
The rule was rejected by the colonies. Before the adoption of the federal
Constitution, the Constitution of Maryland had declared "That, in all crimi-
nal prosecutions, every man hath a right.., to be allowed counsel;..." (Art.
XIX, Constitution of 1776). The Constitution of Massachusetts, adopted in
1780 (Part the First, Art. XII), the Constitution of New Hampshire, adopted
in 1784 (Part I, Art. XV), the Constitution of New York of 1777 (Art.
XXXIV), and the Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776 (Art. IX), had also
declared to the same effect. And in ie case of Pennsylvania, as early as
1701, the Penn Charter (Art. V) declared that "all Criminals shall have tile
same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their Prosecutors"; and there
was also a provision in the Pennsylvania statute of May 31, 1718 (Dallas, Laws
of 1700-1781, Vol. 1, p. 134), that in capital cases learned counsel should be
assigned to the prisoners.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932).
92 The jury of the eighteenth century, despite its land-owning qualifications, was
forbidden to hear cases of poaching or smuggling, trials fur crimes thatjuries of mid-
riling commoners would annul. See Douglas Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal
Law, in ALInON'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTI--CENTURY ENGLAND
39 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975). The division in interest between jurors and the
tipper and professional classes would increase throughout the nineteenth century
with the expansion of American suffrage and, thus, its venire lists.
93 .Judge May believed that the reasonable-doubt instruction favored the defense.
He appears, however, to have been comparing such an instruction to one that did not
concern itself much with any form of doubt. May, supra note 80, at 656.94 Lawrence Solan likewise concludes that Morano's and Shapiro's positions do
not necessarily conflict, but Solan emphasizes the difference in scope of their studies,
Morano considering the instruction in the light of American cases, and Shapiro in the
light of English cases. Solan, supra note 5, at 111 n.24.
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In the earliest use on the American bench-or at least in the ear-
liest published opinion I have found reflecting use on the American
bench-of reasonableness as a qualification of certainty and doubt re-
lated to a verdict, President Shippen, speaking for the Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas in 1790 in Cowperthwaite v. Jones,9 5 distin-
guished the confidence ajudge must have in ajury's verdict by qualify-
ing acceptable judicial reasons for action with reasonableness:
New trials are frequently necessary, for the purpose of ob-
taining complete justice, but the important right of trial by jury re-
quires they should never be granted without solid and substantial
reasons; otherwise the province of jurymen might be often trans-
ferred to the judges, and they instead of the jury, would become the
real triers of the facts. A reasonable doubt, barely, that justice has
not been done, especially in cases where the value or importance of
the cause is not great, appears to me to be too slender a ground for
them. But, whenever it appears with a reasonable certainty, that ac-
tual and manifest injustice is done, or that the jury have proceeded
upon an evident mistake, either in point of law, or fact, or contrary
to strong evidence, or have grossly misbehaved themselves, or given
extravagant damages, the Court will always give an opportunity, by a
new trial, of rectifying the mistakes of the former jury, and of doing
complete justice to the parties.96
Shippen thus rejected a reasonable doubt in a verdict's justice as
sufficient to overturn the verdict, looking instead to the converse, that
it must be upheld if there is reasonable certainty thatjustice was done.
Shippen's analysis is important to this discussion, however, in that
every element of his analysis-doubt, certainty, and reasons them-
selves-were qualified by reasonableness.117 The reasons by which the
judge might act, a set including both doubts about justice and cer-
tainty about injustice, must here be "solid and substantial." Both "cer-
95 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 55 (Pa. Comm. Pleas 1790). As Philip Hamburger has quite
rightly reminded me, the difficulties posed by colonial and early federal reports
makes dubious any assertion of a first use of any concept on the early bench.
96 Id. at 55-56.
97 Shippen was fond of using reasonableness as a test for law. See, e.g., Phile v.
The Anna, I U.S. (I Dall.) 218 (Pa. Comm. Pleas 1787) ("[W]e should so interpret
the letter of the law, as to render its operation reasonable and 'just, the source of
punishment to the guilty, but of certain acquital to the innocent."); Taylor v. Knox, 1
U.S. (1 DalI.) 170 (Pa. Comm. Pleas 1785) (holding that reasonable rule of habitation
for citizenship would require twelve months). He saw no reason for the jury not to
assess the reasonableness of others' conduct. See, e.g., Robertson v. Vogle, I U.S. (1
DalI.) 271 (Pa. Comm. Pleas 1788) (holding that jury should determine reasonable-
ness of notice to creditor of debtor's intent to dishonor); cf Pons' Ex'rs v. Kelly, 3
N.C. (2 Hayw.) 45 (Super. L. & Eq. 1798) (holding that jury determines reasonable-
ness of notice).
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tainty" and "doubt, barely," must be "reasonable," although this
element in common between doubt and certainty was insufficient to
give them common importance. Reasonable concerns to a bare doubt
were still not enough for a judge to interfere with a jury's verdict.
Even though in this usage, whatever qualification was added to "cer-
tainty" or "doubt" by their being reasonable is difficult to assess,Judge
Shippen's limit of even a bare doubt to the reasonable would suggest
that he believed in a limit to the concept of doubt implied by reason.
It appears that the use of "reasonable doubt" in an instruction to
the jury gained greatly in currency soon after the publication ofJudge
Shippen's remarks.'x It appears in some admiralty hearings and crim-
inal trials, and it was used from the bench in a jury instruction at least
before 1793; Chief Justice Kinsey, in a New Jersey capital burglary in-
struction in 1793, referred to reasonable doubt as a humane measure
and described the instruction without a sense of novelty. -
Judge May chronicled several usages of the term in Irish treason
trials in the 1790s,") and there were undoubtedly many trials in
America that are not well recorded. Even so, there are closing argu-
ments and judicial instructions much more frequently recorded
through the 1790s in both England and America, in which jurors were
98 Notwithstanding the occasional instructions of counsel, as in the Boston Massa-
cre cases, it appears that reasonable doubt became common in American courts at
about this time. Given the casual manner with which Shippen employed the term
"reasonable" relating to doubt, it is most likely that the term had already gained some
currency with the American bench as a qualification of doubt. Still, Shippen used
"reasonable doubt" in a distinct question before the court, which would suggest it was
a current phrase for more than jury verdicts, and not necessarily closely associated
with them, a consideration underscored by Justice Wilson's failure to use reasonable
doubt in considering jury verdicts in his lectures of the same year. See 2 WILSON, supra
note 24. Wigmore, the magus of evidence, whose distaste for reasonable-doubt in-
structions is chronicled below, see infra Part VIA, also believed the instructions gained
currency about this time. See 5 WI.NIORE, EvIDENC E, supra note 80, at 464-70.
99 In instructing a jury that convicted the defendant of burglary, leading to a
sentence of death, Chief justice Kinsey remarked,
It is impossible to lay down any general rule, or to declare from what circum-
stances particular intentions are to be inferred. No two cases are exactly
similar, and it is the business of the jury to form their opinion from a serious
and deliberate consideration of the FacLs which appear in the testimony. It
is, however, a good rule, and it is also a humane rule, to which every virtuous
man will assent, that where reasonable doubts exist, the jury, particularly in
capital cases, should incline to acquit rather than condemn.
State v. Wilson, 1 N.I.L. 439, 442 (1793).
100 May, supra note 80, at 656-58.
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charged to acquit if they held any doubts of the defendant's guilt.",'
Furthermore, the early life of the reasonable-doubt instruction ap-
pears to be limited solely to capital trials," 2 although few trials for
such offenses employed it."'4 There are instances of its use over the
next quarter-century, and it was obviously well established by 1850.1""4
Even so, it took some time to enter into the legal imagination as the
sine qua non of the criminal juror's obligations.
III. THE MERGER OF REASONABLE DOUBT AND MORAL CERTAINTY
In the early years of the nineteenth century, there were three es-
sential forms for talking about the jurors' obligations to acquit-if
they had any doubts, if they lacked moral certainty, or if they had
reasonable doubts. Certainly, for many writers, lawyers, judges, and
jurors, these ideas were synonymous. Even so, it is also evident, if
from nothing else than Adams's preference for doubt and Robert
Paine's preference for reasonable doubt in the Boston Massacre cases,
that prosecutors sought to limit juror doubt to a reasonable doubt.
The synthesis among these three views was, in fact, the replace-
ment of the "any doubt" standard with a hybrid view of moral certainty
and reasonable doubt. It came in Thomas Starkie's very successful
Evidence,1 5 first printed in London in 1822 and in America two years
101 See cases collected in Morano, supra note 7, at 512. The potential significance
of variations among particular formulation of these instructions, which included "be-
yond a doubt," "beyond all doubt," and "beyond any doubt" is considered in Solan,
supra note 5, at 134-42.
102 See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 80, at 464-65.
103 Most felony cases continued merely to require a verdict from the jury without
attempting to limit the juror in how the decision was reached. See, e.g., State v. Pom-
pey, 2 Del. Cas. 113 (Quar. Sess. 1798) (containing the argument of Nicholas Ridgley,
Attorney General: "You will, gentlemen, according to the evidence adduced to you
find the prisoner either guilty of murder or manslaughter"); State v. Weaver, 3 N.C.
(2 Hayw.) 54 (Super. L. & Eq. 1798) ("If none of these circumstances are to be found
in the case, and you are of opinion that the killing with the pistol was with malice
aforethought, as before explained, then the prisoner is guilty of murder."); State v.
Norris, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 429 (Super. L. & Eq. 1796) ("The jury will now take the law,
the facts, and the circumstances of this case, and by a careful comparison of the one
with the other, they will draw a conclusion and say whether the prisoner is guilty of
murder or manslaughter.").
104 See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295 (1850); see also infra
note 132 and accompanying text.
105 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRA(YIICAL TREATISE OF TIE LAW OF EVIDENCE AND DIGEST
OF PROOFS, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (1824).
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later, running through numerous editions."l Starkie inventoried the
role and function of various types of testimony and physical evidence
that were sufficient to meet various burdens of proof, arguing that
each of his rules was reasonable, although he took into account nu-
merous problems of moral proof. 7 For example, in speaking of
proof of a crime by circumstantial evidence, he argued at length for
the jury to be required to eliminate all hypotheses of the crime until
they had been reduced to the one remaining hypothesis of guilt. The
evidence needed to prove circumstances "to a moral certainty,"
should "exclude every other supposition" by the state.,
In speaking of the general criminal verdict based on circumstan-
tial evidence, Starkie said,
What circumstances will amount to proof can never be [a] matter of
general definition; the legal test is the sufficiency of the evidence to
satisfy the understanding and conscience of the jury. On the one
hand, absolute, metaphysical and demonstrative certainty is not es-
sential to proof by circumstances. It is sufficient if they produce
moral certainty to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt; even di-
rect and positive testimony does not afford grounds of belief of a
higher and superior nature. To acquit upon light, trivial and fanci-
ful suppositions, and remote conjectures, is a virtual violation of the
juror's oath, and an offence of great magnitude against the interests
of society, directly tending to the disregard of the obligation of a
judicial oath, the hindrance and disparagement of justice, and the
encouragement of malefactors. On the other hand, a juror ought
not to condemn unless the evidence exclude from his mind all rea-
sonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, and, as has been well
observed, unless he be so convinced of the evidence that he would
venture to act upon that conviction in matters of the highest con-
cern and importance in his own interest .... 109
This construction equated moral certainty with the absence of
reasonable doubt, but it also explicitly defined what doubts are rea-
sonable. Reasonable doubts must be significant, or at least not be
doubts that are "light conjectures" or "remote suppositions."
This limited form of doubt by the English barrister troubled his
editor, who took care to insert a note between evidence and doubt,
106 See, e.g, THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (9th
Am. ed. from 4th London ed. 1869); THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE (George Sharswood ed., 9th ed. 1869).
107 Starkie's antecedents and neo-Lockean edge are described in Theodore Wald-
man, Origins of the Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt, 20J. His'. IDEAS 299 (1959).
108 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 513 (Benja-
mrin Gerhard ed., 6th ed. 1842) (1837).
109 id. at 513-14.
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which told a tale not based on a law report but on a "common report
only."I ' It chronicled the story of a servant convicted and executed
for the murder of her mistress. The gist of the proof was that defen-
dant and victim were believed to have been alone in a house with
locked windows and doors. After the execution, the actual murderers
were caught, and one confessed that they had entered through an
upper-story window by a board from a nearby building."I
Even if this story was offered so as to soften Starkie's point, by
such a contrast Starkie's point was even more clearly made: under his
formula, the only allowable doubt was reasonable doubt, and reasona-
ble doubt meant only the truly significant, which might not include
doubts of true but improbable circumstances.
No longer was certainty equal to a lack of doubt or an absence of
doubt by a reasonable person. Moral certainty could only be thwarted
by a significant or likely doubt. Starkie also interjected what may have
been then a novel procedural element to the juror's conduct. The
juror who acts, whether to convict or not to convict, must act with
gravity. ' 12
Lastly, Starkie maintained the ethical significance of the juror's
role, in a manner not too far from the double meaning of Bishop
Wilkins's moral certainty: the juror must be satisfied in both "under-
standing and conscience" that the evidence is sufficient to find guilt.
Even with the heightened emphasis on reason, the ethical notion of
moral certainty was retained as a basis of practical reason in the juror's
decision to act.
Starkie's view of the strength of a doubt necessary to be reasona-
ble was -not, however, the only rationalist model of proof. In his fa-
mous evidence treatise, Harvard's Simon Greenleaf deliberately built
upon Starkie's ideas, among others, in describing the role of reason as
demanding an approach between utter credulity and utter skepti-
cism.' i:1 While Greenleaf did not refute any of Starkie's language on
rational limits of doubt or the bases of reason, Greenleaf was charac-
teristically more circumspect on the origins of belief. For instance, he
fleshed out the idea of circumstantial proof by reduction to a sole
hypothesis by means that were much more comprehensive in their
110 Id. at 513 n.c.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 16-17 (Boston, Lit-
tle, Brown & Co., 13th ed. 1876) (1842). For a discussion of Greenleaf's influence as
a treatise-writer and teacher, see STEVE SHEPPARD, THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES 17-18, 348, 620-21
(1999).
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evaluation. Indeed, when considering the problem of the sole re-
maining hypothesis, Greenleaf not only qualified his result but also
included instinct among his bases of belief:
This is merely the legal application, in other terms, of a process,
familiar in natural philosophy, showing the truth of a hypothesis by
its coincidence with existing phenomena. The connections and co-
incidences, to which we refer may be either physical or moral; and
the knowledge of them is derived from the known laws of matter
and motion, from animal instincts, and from the physical, intellec-
tual, and moral constitution and habits of man. Their force de-
pends on their sufficiency to exclude every other hypothesis but the
one under consideration. Thus, the possession of goods recently
stolen, accompanied with personal proximity in point of time and
place, and inability in the party charged, to show how he came by
them, would seem naturally, though not necessarily, to exclude
every hypothesis but that of his guilt. But the possession of the same
goods, at a remoter time and place, would warrant no such conclu-
sion, as it would leave room for the hypothesis of their having been
lawfully purchased in the course of trade.' 14
From this approach, a bit further elaborated, Greenleaf then
merely repeated the by-then standard burdens of proof, that jurors
should decide civil cases "in favor of the party on whose sides the
weight of the evidence preponderates, and according to the reasona-
ble probability of truth," allowing a deduction from evidence if it
"agrees with and supports the hypothesis, which it is adduced to
prove."' 15
There were considerable obstacles to certainty as a matter of suffi-
ciency in Greenleaf s approach. He emphasized that, although the
criminal jury may convict on circumstantial evidence, "it must exclude
every other hypothesis but that of the guilt of the party."' 16
The criminal jury, however, had a greater task than strictly recon-
structing the facts of past events, one that included ensuring that the
state, and not the defendant, proved its case:
[b]ecause of the more serious and irreparable nature of the conse-
quences of a wrong decision, the jurors are required to be satisfied,
beyond any reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the accused, or it is
their duty to acquit him; the charge not being proved by that higher
degree of evidence which the law demands.' 17
114 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 113, at 15-16.
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The jurors' acts were still the basis for justice, which could be
wrongly applied.
Following one or another of these formulae, many states in the
1830s and 1840s adopted forms of burdens of proof that required the
jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,"18 a requirement often
made synonymous with finding guilt to a moral certainty.' I',t From this
wide variation in instructions and standards, some coalescence oc-
curred following the most famous reasonable-doubt case of the time,
written in Massachusetts almost a decade after Massachusetts had
adopted a reasonable-doubt rule.' 20
The fame enduring into this century of the 1850 opinion in Com-
monwealth v. Webster spilled over from the eminence of its author, Mas-
sachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, 12 1 but it would have been
famous nonetheless. It was a trial for the murder of a well-known fin-
ancier, George Parkman, a heavyweight Harvard professor, benefac-
tor, and a creditor of Dr. John Webster, the Erving Professor of
Chemistry. During an argument in his laboratory over the debt, Web-
ster allegedly hit and killed Parkman with a tree stump and then dis-
membered the body in a failed attempt to hide it.122 The subsequent
trial, an "American classic," observed by 60,000 spectators in ten-min-
ute rotations, led to a six-hour jury instruction by Chief Justice
Shaw.123 Although his instructions were later attacked for their con-
struction of the presumption of malice in homicide cases without a
plea of extenuating circumstances, 24 the portions on reasonable
doubt elicited little criticism and have become legendary:
118 A skein of cases is collected in Morano, supra note 7, at 520-24.
119 See, e.g.,Jones v. State, 14 So. 772, 773 (Ala. 1894) (stating that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and proof to a moral certainty are "legal equivalents"); State v. Sta-
ley, 14 Minn. 75, 90-91 (1869) (stating that moral certainty is proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt).
120 See Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841).
121 The standard study of Shaw is LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH AND CHIEFJUSTICE SHAW (1957).
122 Webster was said to have confessed after the trial, although the confession was
denounced as a fraud, only one of the alterations of the record made to add weight to
the verdict against Webster. Alan Dershowitz, Introduction to REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF
PROFESSORJOHN W. WEBSTER (1990) (1850). The sensational case has prompted nu-
merous retellings. See, e.g., GEORGE DILNOT, THE TRIAL OF PROFESSOR JOHN WHITE
WEBSTER (1928); ROBERT SULLIVAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF DR. PARKMAN (1971).
123 RICHARD B. MORRIS, FAIR TRIAL 156-203 (1952).
124 See LEVY, supra note 121, at 220-28 (describing instruction as just right); Joel
Parker, The Law of Homicide, 72 N. AM. L. REV. 178 (1851) (describing instruction as
too lax); id. at 193-94 (describing instruction as too harsh). One reason for the con-
temporary criticism was the widespread belief, perhaps borne of the strong evidence,
2003] 1199
1200 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:4
[W] hat is reasonable doubt? It is a term often used, probably pretty
well understood, but not easily defined. It is not mere possible
doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depend-
ing on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison
and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in
that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction,
to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of
proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law indepen-
dent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is pre-
sumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof
there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the
benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a
probability, though a strong one arising from the doctrine of
chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the
contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a
reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and di-
rects the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment, of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to
be proof beyond reasonable doubt. 125
In this brief moment, Shaw coalesced various strains of thought
into what would become the dogma of the standard for the next cen-
tury. Recognizing the difficulty of the task of definition, he required
that Webster was innocent and wrongly convicted by the jurors, whom Shaw swayed.
See SULLIVAN, supra note 122, at 143-50.
125 Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850). The instruc-
tions recorded may not, in fact, have been those Shaw read to the jury. Shaw seems to
have edited them heavily. See Dershowitz, supra note 122. The official report is the
basis for most all of the later citations to Shaw's opinion, and for this reason its discus-
sion of reasonable doubt appears supra. More likely, Shaw's actual instruction was
more terse, although it made essentially the same points. Stone's transcript of the
trial records the instruction:
Now, then, Gentlemen, what is reasonable doubt? It is not possible doubt
only, because everything is doubtful. It is that doubt which, after the entire
consideration of all the evidence has been taken, leaves theJu y uncertain.
It is not a mere probability, arising from the doctrine of chances, that it is
more likely to be so than otherwise; but a reasonable, moral certainty; that is,
a certainty that weighs upon the mind, weighs upon the understanding, satis-
fies the reason and judgment, that, without leaving any other hypothesis, the
facts are such as to implicate the defendant, and do not implicate anybody
else. This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because, if it went
beyond that, it if required absolute certainty, as it is of a moral character, this
species of evidence would always be insufficient. It is, therefore, that evi-
dence which excludes every other hypothetical, beyond reasonable doubt.
SULLIVAN, supra note 122, at 287. Justice Sullivan believed that the Stone transcript
was the least revised after the fact among the reports of the trial. Id. at 182.
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doubt to have importance, but its role would remain to preclude the
jurors from being morally certain. A reasonable doubt would pre-
clude a guilty verdict, and a failure of the prosecution to "establish the
truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty" is proof that a
reasonable doubt exists. 126 A specific reasonable doubt, for ChiefJus-
tice Shaw, therefore did not require articulation; reasonable doubt
could be had by the failure to convince to a level of certainty as it
"directs the understanding."'' 27
The epistemological significance of this rendering is considera-
ble. The juror's private understanding and conviction was based on
evidence that arose to a reasonable and a moral certainty. In this,
Shaw might have been equating the moral with the reasonable, and
yet such a redundant interpretation is unnecessary. A more plausible
rendering is that Shaw was dividing the ethical from the historical
senses of Bishop Wilkins's view, that reasonable certainty was the basis
for historical understanding and that moral certainty was the basis of
the practical foundation ethically to decide to act by finding guilt or
innocence.
Reasonable doubt was, in its adolescence, the converse of the sum
of both reasonable certainty and moral certainty. There was no partic-
ular notion of the scope of the reasonableness which must attend a
doubt. Reasonable doubt was the function of the mind that inter-
fered with both historical and ethical certainty, the sum of which was
the sentiment of conviction necessary to find guilt. It was no more
than a doubt-any doubt-that would be held by a reasonable
person.
What distinguished reasonable doubt from all other doubts was
precisely that a reasonable person would form the doubt based not on
general preoccupations relating to human affairs but upon a consider-
ation limited to the evidence presented in the case at hand. As Justice
Shaw put it, the doubt was to be formed, if it was formed, from the
context of the case as a whole, a rich matrix of "the entire comparison
and consideration of all the evidence."1 28 There is no sense in which
the juror was required to articulate the nature or premises of the
doubt in order to demonstrate its reasonableness.
The juror's task at the time of the Webster case, however cloaked
in the luxurious theories of truth from the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries, could be said to be little changed from the task given
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the jurors in Dowman's Case 29 two centuries earlier, to decide the
facts in issue in the case and no others and then to render a decision
on guilt or its lack. This similitude is particularly clear when seen in
the light of Greenleaf's inclusion of even animal instincts as the basis
of belief.
Even so, there are sharp edges to this view, and a close reading of
Starkie, or a careful review of the prosecution's use of the terms in the
Boston Massacre cases' or Irish Treason trials 3' suggests a harsher
perspective: the juror was being turned from the task of testing the
prosecutor's case for sufficient proof of guilt toward the new task of
testing the defendant's argument for sufficient proof of doubts.
Moral certainty would remain an important element in defining
the burden of proof, the analog of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
throughout the century. It would be used on federal1 32 and state 3 "
129 See supra notes 12 & 21 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
132 See, for example, Miles v. United Staies, 103 U.S. 304, 309 (1881), where the
Court upheld the instruction and stated,
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such as will produce an abiding convic-
tion in the mind to a moral certainty that the fact exists that is claimed to
exist, so that you feel certain that it exists. A balance of proof is not suffi-
cient. Ajuror in a criminal case ought not to condemn unless the evidence
excludes from his mind all reasonable doubt; unless he be so convinced by
the evidence, no matter what the class of the evidence, of the defendant's
guilt, that a prudent man would feel safe to act upon that conviction in mat-
ters of the highest concern and importance to his own dearest personal
interests.
Id.; see also Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563 (1914) (approving reasonable-doubt
instruction as moral certainty); Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1907)
(approving circumstantial evidence as a basis for finding no reasonable doubt); Fidel-
ity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 666 (1902) (finding proof to a moral
certainty to be equivalent to the concept of reasonable doubt).
133 See Ex parte Taylor, 666 So. 2d 73, 85 (Ala. 1995) (holding that the instruction
was not plain error); People v. Stanley, 897 P.2d 481, 500 (Cal. 1995) (holding that
"the reasonable-doubt instruction does not constitute error"); Rivers v. State, 484
S.E.2d 519, 514 (Ga. App. 1997) (holding the instruction was not erroneous in con-
text); State v. Hoffman, 851 P.2d 934, 939 (Idaho 1993) (holding instruction did not
violate due process); Tobias v. State, 666 N.E.2d 68, 72-73 (Ind. 1996) (holding that
council was not deficient for failing to object to instruction); State v. Acree, 916 P.2d
61, 66-67 (Kan. App. 1996) (holding instruction did not violate due process); Evans v.
State, 499 A.2d 1261, 1287-88 (Md. 1985) (holding that moral certainty language was
comparable to reasonable-doubt standard); Commonwealth v. Hart, 703 N.E.2d 1180,
1181 (Mass. 1999) (holding that the instruction was not erroneous); State v. Moor-
man, 505 N.W.2d 593, 604-05 (Minn. 1993) (holding instruction sets a higher stan-
dard of proof); State v. Kittrell, 678 A.2d 209, 220 (N.J. 1996) (holding that the
charge was not unconstitutional); People v. Williams, 675 N.Y.S.2d 445, 446 (App. Div.
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benches for instructing juries, and it would survive appellate and col-
lateral review in the federal courts, 13 4 long after the idea of moral
certainty had fallen into disuse among both philosophers and general
speakers of English.
Of course, to suggest that moral certainty has fallen into disfavor
is not to suggest that certainty has done so. In 1982, a committee of
the Federal Judicial Conference proposed an instruction,'3 5 adopted
in 1987,1315 that defined proof beyond a reasonable doubt as being
1998) (holding that moral certainty actually sets a stricter standard than reasonable
doubt); State v. Taylor, 455 S.E.2d 859, 862-63 (N.C. 1995) (holding moral certainty
instruction was permissible when one of several alternate definitions); State v. Wil-
liams, 828 P.2d 1006, 1021 (Ore. 1992) (holding instruction was not reversible error);
State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 644 (R.I. 1989) (holding that reasonable doubt
could be "properly equated" with proof of guilt beyond a moral certainty); State v.
Hallock, 875 S.W.2d 285, 294 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (holding instruction was not
erroneous); State v. Cervantes, 942 P.2d 382, 385 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
it was "not reasonably likely" that instruction caused jury to apply a lower standard).
Compare State v. Bryant, 432 S.E.2d 291, 297 (N.C. 1993) (rejecting instruction of
moral certainty as not protecting defendant), with People v. Young, 653 N.Y.S.2d 471,
472 (App. Div. 1997) (rejecting moral and reasonable certainty as not protecting de-
fendant). But see Allman v. State, 571 So. 2d 244, 252 (Miss. 1990) (holding moral
certainty instruction misleading).
134 See Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the instruc-
tion was not unconstitutional); Schneider v. Day, 73 F.3d 610, 611 (5th Cir. 1996)
(permitting instruction, as it was "not unconstitutional"); Harvell v. Nagle, 58 F.3d
1541, 1541 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that any reversible error was "eviscerated by the
rest of the jury charge"); United States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 1224 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding it was inadvisable, but not erroneous); Morley v. Stenberg, 25 F.3d 687,
688-89 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the instruction was not unconstitutional);
United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1060 (4th Cir. 1985) (allowing "reasonable
moral certainty"); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1982) ("Standing
alone, this language does not constitute plain error."); Odle v. Calderon, 884 F. Supp.
1404, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the instruction does not deny due process).
But see Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1994) (holding the instruction was po-
tentially ambiguous); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (holding that moral
certainty language is erroneous if used in the wrong context); Gilday v. Callahan, 59
F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that moral certainty instruction alone may be
reversible error); Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306, 1311 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that
moral certainty dilutes instruction below due process); Perez v. Irwin, 963 F.2d 499,
502 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding moral certainty instruction was ill-advised, as it may lead
to emotional doubt); Morley v. Stenberg, 828 F. Supp. 1413, 1420 (D. Neb. 1993)
(instructing jurors "that they may find guilt based upon something other than the
factual evidence").
135 COMM. To STUDY CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (1982) [hereinafter FJC INSTRUCTIONS].
136 SUBCOMM. ON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (1987).
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equivalent to proof that leaves you firmly convinced. 13 7 This simple
alteration of the then-California-style "moral certainty" into "firm con-
viction" was both explanatory and in keeping with the original notion
of moral certainty. It was also a move that, perhaps inadvertently,
again moved American standards of proof more closely into line with
twentieth-century English standards 138 as well as the standards of the
civilian world. 13
IV. THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES: REASONABLE
DOUBT BECOMES ARTICUIABIE DOUBT
As the nineteenth century progressed, American culture changed
dramatically, and the effects of its change were felt both at the bar and
in the jury room. Thejury was more democratic. With the opening of
137 FJC INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 135, at 17-18 (1988) (instruction 21), quoted with
approval, Victor, 511 U.S. at 27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The instruction is set out in
whole in the appendix to this Article.
138 English courts had followed the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
since the latter half of the nineteenth century. In 1949, Lord Goddard noted that the
principal requirements of a criminal jury are that the jurors "are made to understand
that they have to be satisfied and must not return a verdict against a defendant unless
they feel sure, and that the onus is all the time on the prosecution and not on the
defence, then whether the judge uses one form of language or another is neither
here nor there." R. v. Kritz, [1950] 1 K.B. 82, 90 (Ct. Crim. App. 1949) (Lord God-
dard, C.J.); see R. v. Summers [1952] 1 All E.R. 1059; R. v. Hepworth, [1955] 2 Q.B.
600 (Lord Goddard, C.l.) This formulation persists, despite criticism. See, e.g., R. v.
Kellett [1976] Q.B. 372 CA (Crim. Div.) (Lord Widgery, C.J.) (containingjury instruc-
tion of "Are you satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt and so that you are sure?"); R.
v. Bentley, [2001] 1 Cr. App. R. 21 ("reasonable doubt" or "you are sure" required in
instruction). Compare ANDREWS AND HIRST ON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 106-07 (3d ed.
1997) (arguing that instruction to be sure was unhelpful to judges); and A.S. ZUCKER-
MAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 131(1989) (arguing that "reasonable
doubt" is not self-explanatory and that the jurors will not have a common sense of
what is required), withJOHN SMITH, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 36 (1995) (arguing that "be
sure" instruction upheld in Summers was too lenient).
It should be noted that, notwithstanding Professor Solan's assertions to the con-
trary, England has not abandoned reasonable doubt altogether but has allowed both
instructions to be used. Compare Solan, supra note 5, at 106 (citing Walters v. Queen,
2 App. Cas. 26, 30 (P.C. 1969)), with sources cited supra.
139 French and other continental systems have long applied the rule of in dubio pro
reo-"when in doubt acquit." See George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Com-
parative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968).
This difference may reflect a greater difference in the Anglo-American reliance on
casuistry and reason, which is not as widely shared as we might believe. See George P.
Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970 (1981); Louis Recas~ns-Siches,
The Logic of the Reasonable as Differentiated from the Logic of the Rational (Human Reason in
the Making and the Interpretation of the Law), in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF
ROSCOE POUND 192 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1962).
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voter lists following the Reconstruction Amendments, the venire now
included the poor, Catholics, immigrants, the illiterate, non-whites,
and-eventually-even women.'
40
The bar was also changing, in a manner that was at the same time
more democratic and more elite. With the advent of a new notion of
"legal science," the dominant metaphor of nineteenth-century Ameri-
can law, the law was seen to be both more transparent and predict-
able, or at least discoverable, and yet the legal savant was just as elite
from the laity as ever. 141 The new lawyer was no longer an oracle but
a scientist, and the law could be just as inaccessible to the layman lack-
ing legal scientific knowledge as it had been to the laymen unlearned
in the ways of the golden metwand of the common law. Moreover, the
lawyers could hardly be expected to presume the new classes of lay
jurors properly could acquit themselves in their newfound roles with-
out guidance. The guidance took, then, the forms of legal science,
which gave new tools of both explanation and limitation of the juror's
function in the criminal trial.
The importation of method from the social sciences, accelerated
by the work of Englishmen Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and, later,
Herbert Spencer, led to American criticism of law as a science, and
critics in this vein sought to introduce greater predictability and scien-
tific rationalism to the methods of American adjudication.' 42 In the
law of evidence, this growing worship of rationalism pervaded the le-
gal treatises, classrooms, and courtrooms of America.14s So it is unsur-
prising that lawyers and judges would attempt to become more
specific, more calculable in delineating the role of reasonableness in
doubt.
From early on, various lines of cases attempted to locate the
doubt that is a reasonable doubt among a variety of linguistic alterna-
140 I am grateful to Albert Alschuler and Tracey Meares for emphasizing for me
the importance of growing diversity of the venire, and the potential for a resulting
mistrust of the bar of the jury on the growth jury instructions. The rise of the demo-
cratic jury is described in JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THEJURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE
IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (1994).
141 See generally M.H. Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Lang-
dell, in 2 SHEPPARD, supra note 113, at 589; Howard Schweber, Before Langdell: The Roots
of American Legal Science, in 2 SHEPPARD, supra note 113, at 606.
142 See, e.g, David Dudley Field, The Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science, in 2
SHEPPARD, supra note 113, at 658; Christopher C. Langdell, Teaching Law As a Science,
in 1 SHEPPARD, supra note 113, at 514.
143 William Twining has suggested that a continuum may be described between
the evidentiary theories of the early and later nineteenth century, throughout which
an aspiration for reason persisted independent of the degrees to which reason was the
basis for decision. See TwINING, supra note 54, at 12-18.
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tives. Some of these were designed to define further the idea of rea-
sonable doubt, some to limit or expand the notion.144
A. Reasonable Doubts Become Specific and Articulable Doubts
One strain of development was to emphasize as reasonable the
long-standing limits imposed by evidence on the range of inferences
that ajuror could draw from the evidence. So, for instance, a success-
ful treatise on facts explained that a doubt that is a rational doubt
must "spring from and bejustified by the evidence alone, to the entire
exclusion of all surmises which the jury might entertain of circum-
stances not contained in the evidence."' 4 5 An application of this ap-
proach would limit the jury from surmising that someone in
possession of stolen goods might have them legally unless there is
proof that they had been purchased or been given as a gift.' 46 This
was little more than a continuing enforcement of the juror's role as
arbiter and not as witness.
A more frequent explanation of reasonableness, and a far greater
alteration of its earlier meaning, was the practice of describing reason-
able doubts as articulable doubts. Although it may be that every rea-
sonable doubt instruction implies a requirement like articulability, the
idea that a juror must be able to state the doubt on which to acquit
the defendant goes very far afield from our view of the prosecution
having to prove its case to the juror's judgment of certainty. 147
While the origins of this trial practice are hard to locate precisely,
the instruction on articulable doubt appears to have become an ac-
cepted legal practice thanks to its deployment by an editor of one of
the many posthumous editions of Simon Greenleaf's Evidence.'48 In
144 Wigmore collects many of these variations. See generally 5 WIGMORE, supra note
80; see also infra note 261.
145 JAMES RAM, A TREATISE ON FA(rs As SUBJECT OF INQUIRY BY A JURY 307 (John
Townshend ed., 1873).
146 Id. This example is at once both as essential and more simplistic than the
similar, if more cautious result posited by Greenleaf. See supra text accompanying
note 113.
147 See supra Part II.C.
148 The author has located one earlier use of the instruction, beginning a long see-
saw in Alabama. See, e.g., Cohen v. State, 50 Ala. 108, 111 (1873) (reasonable doubt is
"a doubt for which a reason could be given: a probability of the defendant's inno-
cence"), rev'd, Ray v. State, 50 Ala. 104 (1874), reinstated Hodge v. State, 12 S. 164
(Ala. 1893), rev'd, Bodine v. State, 29 So. 926 (Ala. 1901). But seeWhitfield v. State, 17
So. 761 (Ala. Ct. App. 1928) (including instruction that reasonable doubt requires a
reason not improper). Cohen's instruction, made at the request of the defense, is
tantalizingly ambiguous in stating merely "reasonable doubt has been defined." Co-
hen, 50 Ala. at 111. It is not clear whether this is a reference to another source or to
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the fourteenth edition the editors slipped in a footnote to Greenleaf's
discussion of reasonable doubt:
Jurists have not been very successful in defining what is a reasonable
doubt and are disinclined to be held to any form of words .... All
the authorities agree that such a doubt must be actual and substan-
tial, as contradistinguished from a mere vague apprehension. An
undefinable doubt, which cannot be stated with the reason upon
which it rests, so that it may be examined and discussed, can hardly
be considered a reasonable doubt, as such a one would render the
administration of justice impracticable. 149
Setting aside the subtle departures from the intent of Greenleaf's
original text, this note is a classic of misleading treatise writing. The
reader is drawn to believe that the authorities all agree that a doubt
that might lead a juror to convict cannot be an "undefinable doubt,
which cannot be stated with the reason upon which it rests, so that it
may be examined and discussed." Further, there are three nice cases
for the proposition, at least, that an "undefinable doubt ... can hardly
be considered a reasonable doubt, as such a one would render the
administration of justice impracticable." No other authorities had
supported this proposition, and the cited three cases had little to do
with it.
The three cases cited, Harmon,15°1 Earll,15 1 and Foulke,152 all repeat
the proposition that a reasonable doubt must be an important
doubt.15 3 The opinion closest to the idea that reasonableness requires
definition is that of the Philadelphia trial judge in Harmon, who re-
the court's own definition for the jury, but it might suggest an earlier reference, even
though none has yet been unearthed by the author.
149 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 33-34 n.a. (Simon
Greenleaf Croswell ed., 14th ed. 1883); cf. 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF EVIDENCE 34-35 (John Henry Wigmore & Edward Avery Harriman eds., 16th
ed. 1899) (cited lines appear only in the fourteenth and fifteenth editions) [hereinaf-
ter GREENLEAF, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE (16TH ED.)].
150 Commonwealth v. Harmon, 4 Pa. 269 (1846).
151 Earll v. People, 73 Ill. 329 (1874).
152 United States v. Foulke, 6 McLean 349 (Ohio Unrep. Cas. Apr. Term 1855).
153 See Harmon, 4 Pa. at 274 (affirming the conviction of a mother for infanticide
on circumstantial evidence when the jury charged that "a doubt, to work an acquittal,
must be serious and substantial-not the mere possibility of a doubt"); Earll, 73 I11. at
333-34. The EarIl court affirmed the jury's conviction for abortion when the jury was
charged that a
[r]easonable doubt means, in law, a serious, substantial and well-founded
doubt, and not the mere possibility of a doubt, and the jury have no right to
go outside of the evidence to search for or hunt up doubts (in order to
acquit the defendant,) not arising from the evidence or want of evidence.
Earl, 73 Il1. at 333-34; see also infra note 156.
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quired the jury to acquit if the jury "can reconcile [the evidence] to
any reasonable hypothesis of innocence .... if not, you are bound to
say so."154 But to require a reasonable hypothesis of innocence in a
case based on circumstantial evidence is not the same as to say that all
doubts must be definable. 155 The most outrageous failure of the au-
thority to support this opinion was the cite to Foulke,156 in which ajury
acquitted a postmaster of stealing money from a letter. The jury was
instructed, apparently by U.S. DistrictJudge H.H. Leavit, in wonderful
language that had nothing to do with whether the doubts of a juror
need be stated:
You, gentlemen, are tojudge of the weight of the evidence, and the
credibility of the witnesses. There is no tribunal but that before
which we must all appear, which can rightly judge of the motives of
human action. We have no such standard; and at best, we can only
determine matters of controversy, civil and criminal, on the highest
probability of facts, from the evidence. But, in every criminal case,
where a conviction is utterly ruinous to the accused, ajury will ac-
quit, if they have reasonable doubts of his guilt; but, these doubts
must not arise from our sympathies but from a deliberate considera-
tion of the evidence.15 7
The best that might be said of this citation is that the editors of
Evidence construed Judge Leavit's use of "deliberate consideration" to
mean deliberation among the jurors in their consideration prior to
the verdict, rather than a careful consideration of the evidence.
There is no reason in Leavit's opinion to accept such a strained read-
ing here, and the idea that the juror must carefully consider the evi-
dence, as we have seen, was much more firmly established in the law.
154 Hannon, 4 Pa. at 274.
155 The problem is a collapse in Harmon of the instruction regarding the isolation
of presumptions in cases of circumstantial evidence with the instruction on what can
constitute a reasonable doubt. See, for example, Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887), in
which the trial judge applied both forms of instruction, the circumstantial evidence
instruction in language like Harmon's, after which the court began to define reasona-
ble doubt. In Hopt, the jury was charged,
The court charges you that the law presumes the defendant innocent until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That if you can reconcile the evi-
dence before you upon any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defen-
dant's innocence, you should do so, and in that case find him not guilty.
You are further instructed that you cannot find the defendant guilty unless
from all the evidence you believe him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
id. at 439.
156 Foulke, 6 McLean at 349.
157 Id. at 355.
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Despite this awkward origin, the note had considerable influence,
appearing as it did in the leading American evidence text. It would
remain in subsequent editions until Greenleaf's editor became the
great Wigmore, who purged it in the place of his own notes, tinted
with his hostility to reasonable doubt in general. 158
The first reported judicial use of an instruction based on the re-
quirement of articulability appears to have been in a widely publicized
jury trial, presided over by the ChiefJustice of the United States.15 9 In
United States v. Butler,1611 a Ku Klux Klan Act criminal enforcement trial
in Reconstruction South Carolina, U.S. Chief Justice Morrison Waite,
presiding at the trial, charged the jury that
a reasonable doubt is something more than a captious doubt, a
mere vague notion that the accused may be innocent. It must be a
doubt for which a reason may be assigned. It need not be a reason
sufficient to convince another, but it must be such as may properly
influence the mind of one who is honestly endeavoring to perform
his solemn duty as juror. 161
It is rather difficult at this distance to assess Chief Justice Waite's
motives in presenting the instruction as requiring that a doubt be a
reason that can be stated. Although he did not have a background in
the criminal law, we must hesitate to conclude his choice was uninten-
tional. 162 We cannot ascertain from the record so far even whether he
158 3 GREENLEAF, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (16TH ED.), supra note 148, at
34-35.
159 There may be earlier examples, although Waite's instruction in Butler appears
to have sparked the modern trend. Many cites to the idea begin with either Butler or
the later New York case, People v. Guidici. See U.S. v. Searcey, 26 F. 435, 442 (W.D.N.C.
1885) (citing People v. Guidici, 3 N.E. 493 (N.Y. 1885)). But see Cohen v. State, 50
Ala. 108 (1873).
160 25 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D.S.C. 1877). Butlerwas one of several Klan trials, the sum
of which were to eviscerate civil rights enforcement in the United States for the next
eighty years. See Lou FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SouTi1 CAROLINA Ku Kux KLAN
TRIALS, 1871-1872 (1996).
161 Butler, 25 F. Cas. at 226. Of the twelve men charged with conspiracy to deprive
another of the vote, the jury fotnd one not guilty and failed to agree on the rest,
resulting in a mistrial. Id.
162 Chief Justice Waite, an Ohioan and graduate of Yale, had represented wealthy
corporate and railroad clients before dabbling in politics and being raised to the
bench. He was generally unsympathetic to enforcement of the Klan act, as well as to
other Reconstruction amendments and statutes, authoring some of the more famous
cases limiting the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. See C. PETER
MAGRATH & MORRIS R. WAITE, THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER (1963); BRUC:E R. TRIMBL.,
CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE: DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTERFST 172 (1938); Richard Claude,
Constitutional Voting Rights and Early U.S. Supreme Court Doctrine, 51 J. NEGRO HIST. 114,
119-24 (1966).
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believed this instruction was helpful to the prosecution or the de-
fense. In any event, Waite was clear in requiring that the reason need
not be persuasive to others, merely the person who employs it.
Waite's instruction was echoed verbatim in the same year from
the federal district court in Maine, in a criminal action for obstruction
of the mail brought against striking union railroadmen.1 3 4 The in-
struction was given by the districtjudge, who emphasized its use by the
ChiefJustice, 164 and the instruction was upheld by the circuit court. 16 5
Use of the instruction grew slowly but steadily, first in the federal
courts,' 6 and then in the states. 16 7 By the turn of the century, the
states appear to have been almost evenly divided, with roughly half of
the states whose appellate courts had considered an instruction re-
quiring a juror to be able to state the doubt rejecting the instruction
as misleading. 161
Of those states that allowed a requirement of articulable doubt, a
typical instruction read,
A reasonable doubt, gentlemen, is not a mere possible doubt; it
should be an actual or substantial doubt. It is such a doubt as a
reasonable man would seriously entertain. It is a serious, sensible
doubt, such as you could give a good reason for. It is not sufficient
you should believe his guilt only probable. In fact, no degree of
probability merely will authorize a conviction, but the evidence
must be of such a character and tendency as to produce a moral
certainty of the prisoner's guilt to the exclusion of reasonable
163 United States v. Stevens, 27 F. Cas. 1312 (C.C.D. Me. 1877) (No. 16,392).
164 Id. at 1313-14.
165 Id. at 1312.
166 See, e.g., U.S. v. Graham, McKay, 102 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 307
U.S. 643, charge quoted in U.S. v. Sussman, 37 F. Supp. 294, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1941); United
States v. Jackson, 29 F. 503 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1886); United States v. Johnson, 26 F. 682,
685 (C.C.D. Ga. 1885) (reasonable doubt "is a doubt that you may entertain, as rea-
sonable men, after a thorough review and consideration of the evidence,-a doubt
for which a good reason, arising from the evidence, can be given").
167 See, e.g., Hodge v. State, 12 So. 164 (Ala. 1893); Wallace v. State, 26 So. 713
(Fla. 1899); Vann v. State, 9 S.E. 945 (Ga. 1889); People v. Steubenvoll, 28 N.W. 883
(Mich. 1886); State v. Newman, 101 N.W. 499 (Minn. 1904); People v. Guidici, 3 N.E.
493 (N.Y. 1885); State v. Jefferson, 10 So. 199 (La. 1891); State v. Grant, 105 N.W. 97
(S.D. 1905); BItler v. State, 78 N.W. 590 (Wis. 1899).
168 See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 25 So. 238 (Ala. 1899); Darden v. State, 84 S.W. 507
(Ark. 1905); Siberry v. State, 33 N.E. 681 (Ind. 1893); State v. Cohen, 78 N.W. 857
(Iowa 1899); Klyce v. State, 28 So. 827 (Miss. 1900); Cowan v. State, 35 N.W. 405
(Neb. 1887); Morgan v. State, 27 N.E. 710 (Ohio 1891); State v. Morey, 36 P. 573 (Or.
1894). Several of these initial reiections have been reduced by later cases. See, e.g.,
Stewart v. State, 730 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Sulie v. State, 379 N.E.2d
455 (Ind. 1978).
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doubt. The evidence should be such as to satisfy your minds to a
certainty, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty of
the crime charged, otherwise you should acquit.'11
The defense in that case had requested an instruction that de-
fined reasonable doubt as grave doubt: "[a] reasonable doubt is not a
mere possible doubt; it should be an actual and substantial doubt, not
mere possibility or speculation." The Louisiana Supreme Court re-
jected this instruction, preferring the instruction given, which it said
was in keeping with the existing law. 170 Similar results, while not uni-
form, were common in state appellate review of similar instructions' 7'
and posed no difficulty for federal review. 172 Occasionally, the articu-
lability standard was even enacted into state statutes, as it was in
Oklahoma from 1910 to 1915, when Oklahoma jurors were told that a
reasonable doubt is
a doubt for which there exists a reason in the minds of the jurors,
founded upon the facts and circumstances in proof in the case, and
is a state of mind of which an ordinarily intelligent man could read-
ily give an explanation, consistent with the facts disclosed by the
evidence, and the law, as given to the jury by the court.17.1
There is little question that the nature of these reasonable doubts
was, by then, synonymous with the doubts of old, the doubts that
would thwart certainty by reasonable people. Indeed, confronted by
this precise question, the New Jersey Supreme Court held in some-
what obtuse language that
[the doctrine contends it] is inaccurate to say that a reasonable
doubt can exist only when the mind remains unconvinced. This we
cannot concede. To us it seems that to be convinced of the exis-
169 State v. Jefferson, 10 So. 199, 200 (La. 1891), quoted and applied in State v.
Gould, 395 So. 2d 647, 656 (La. 1980).
170 Id.
171 For cases upholding reasonable doubt as doubt for which a reason can be
given, see People v. Grove, 120 N.E. 277, 281 (I11. 1918) (holding that the instruction
requiring "that a doubt must be one that the jury can give a reason for and not a
conjured-up doubt" is not wrong); State v. Bailey, 127 A. 589 (N.J. 1925) (reversing
earlier cases); State v. Butler, 146 S.E. 418, 419 (S.C. 1929) (holding that the judge's
jury instruction defining reasonable doubt as "a doubt for which you can give a sound
and substantial reason for" is accurate); State v. Sonnenschein, 159 N.W. 101 (S.D.
1916) (holding that the instruction did not actually require defendant to give reason
to each juror); and State v. Overson, 185 P. 364 (Utah 1919). But see Commonwealth
v. Weiner, 101 Pa. Super. 295 (1930) (instruction of reason that can be given is error).
172 See, e.g., United Statesv. Woods, 66 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1933); Murphy v. United
States, 33 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 584 (1929).
173 OKLAHOMA REW'SEO LAwS § 5876 (1910), repealed Okla. Sess. Laws 269, quoted
in 5 WIGMORE, supra note 80, at 464 n.1
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tence of a thing and to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of its
existence are one and the same condition of mind. 17 4
Similar instructions, however, persist to this day in pattern in-
structions and statutes in some states. Although it is still resisted in
some states, 75 there is, at the close of the century, widespread federal
and state acceptance of the idea that reasonableness includes a re-
quirement of articulability.1 76 Of particular interest are cases in South
Carolina, which have distinguished instructions for reasonable doubt
174 State v. Leo, 77 A. 523, 525 (N.J. 1910).
175 See, e.g., State v. Banks, 927 P.2d 456 (Kan. 1996) (holding that articulable
doubt standard was wrong, but not grounds for a mistrial); Commonwealth v. Thur-
ber, 418 N.E.2d 1253 (Mass. 1981) (holding that articulable doubt standard was not
reversible error); State v. Medina, 685 A.2d 1242 (NJ. 1996) (holding that articulable
doubt standard was rejected but not reversible error in instruction); State v. Boswell,
294 S.E.2d 287 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that thejury instructions determining reasona-
ble doubt were erroneous because jurors need not articulate reasons for their
doubts).
176 See, e.g., Beverly v. Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that "good,
sound substantial doubt" language should not be used); Chalmers v. Mitchell, 73 F.3d
1262, 1268 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 834 (holding that reasonable-doubt
instruction was unwise but "not reasonably likely to be misunderstood" by jurors);
United States v. Dale, 991 F. 2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906 (finding
reasonable-doubt instruction was "sufficient in the context of instructions as a
whole"); United States v. Davis, 328 F.2d 864, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that the
reasonable-doubt instruction is "not approved" and "perhaps unwise," but "not erro-
neous"); Barber v. Scully, 557 F. Supp. 1292, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the
instruction on reasonable doubt was not constitutionally defective); Robinson v. Calla-
han, 694 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that the instruction on reasonable doubt
was not a constitutional error); Jenkins v. State, 627 So. 2d 1034, 1048 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1992) (holding that the instruction defining reasonable doubt as "a doubt for
which reason can be assigned" is not erroneous).; State v. Lewis, 717 A.2d 1140, 1160
(Conn. 1998) (holding that the definition of reasonable doubt as "a doubt for which
a valid reason may be assigned" is not erroneous); Lawson v. State, 402 S.E.2d 344,
345 (Ga. 1991) (holding that the reasonable-doubt instruction is not favored but not
reversible error); Robbins v. State, 532 S.E.2d 127, 131 (Ga. App. 2000) (holding that
instruction of a "doubt that can be given" upheld); Sulie v. State, 522 N.E.2d 380, 384
(Ind. 1988) (holding that the instruction of "a doubt for which a reason may be
given" was upheld); State v. Whipple, 476 S.E.2d 683, 687 (S.C. 1996) (stating that the
juror must be able to give reason); People v. Maldonado, 631 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (App.
Div. 1995), app. denied, 663 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that instruction that a
reasonable doubt is "a doubt based upon reason, and it is a doubt for which ajuror
can give a reason if he or she is called upon to do so in the jury room" is appropriate);
State v. Ferola, 534 A.2d 173, 176 (R.I. 1987) (holding that reasonable-doubt instruc-
tion of "a doubt founded in reason, a doubt to which you can assign a logical and
sound reason and not a doubt arising out of whimsy or caprice" was upheld); State v.
Bembenek, 331 N.W.2d 616, 628 (Wis. 1983) (holding that the reasonable-doubt in-
struction was free from error).
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as acceptable from forbidden instructions requiring a juror to rely on
a "real reason." 177
The requirement that a doubt be articulable, that a juror be able
to explain a doubt in order to hold a reasonable doubt, has created a
distinct dynamic of what type of reason can be assigned successfully.
The need to assign a doubt implies that a generic doubt would be
insufficient, such as "I doubt the prosecutor's case." Such a doubt
would strike many hearers of the instruction as too broad or diffuse to
be anything more than a mere doubt or a speculative doubt, and not
one that "you can give a good reason for." Thus, a doubt must be
focused upon either a specific insufficiency in a prosecutor's case, or
upon a specific proposition in the defense's case.
An inherent difficulty with an articulability requirement of doubt
is that it lends itself to reduction without end. If the juror is expected
to explain the basis for a doubt, that explanation gives rise to its own
need for justification. If a juror's doubt is merely, "I didn't think the
state's witness was credible," the juror might be expected to then say
why the witness was not credible. The requirement for reasons can all
to easily become a requirement for reasons for reasons, ad
infinitum.178
One can also see a potential for creating a barrier to acquit for
less-educated or skilifuljurors. Ajuror who lacks the rhetorical skill to
communicate reasons for a doubt is then, as a matter of law, barred
from acting on that doubt. This bar is more than a basis for other
jurors to reject the first juror's doubt. It is a basis for them to attempt
to convince that juror that the doubt is not a legal basis to vote for
acquittal. 17
A troubling conclusion that arises from the difficulties of the re-
quirement of articulability is that it hinders the juror who has a doubt
based on the belief that the totality of the evidence is insufficient.
Such a doubt lacks the specificity implied in an obligation to "give a
reason," an obligation that appears focused on the details of the argu-
ments. Yet this is precisely the circumstance in which the rhetoric of
177 See State v. Clute, 480 S.E.2d 85, 90 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding a reasona-
ble-doubt instruction as "a doubt for which a reason can be given"), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 982 (1997); State v. Kirkpatrick, 462 S.E.2d 884, 889-90 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995)
(same), distinguishing State v. Manning, 409 S.E.2d 372 (S.C. 1991) (barring instruc-
tion that defined reasonable doubt in terms of "moral or grave certainty" or a "real
reason"). Older cases on this point may be found in H.D. Warren, Annotation, Use of
the Term "Actual Doubt" in Instruction on Reasonable Doubt, 147 A.L.R. 1046 (1943).
178 1 am grateful to Jeremy Waldron for this illustration.
179 For this point, I am thankful to Ed Imwinkelreid.
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the law, particularly the presumption of innocence and the state bur-
den of proof, require acquittal."'
B. Articulability Encouraged by the Pressure of the Advocates and by
Confusion with Other Rules
It is unsurprising that the requirement that a reasonable doubt
be an articulable doubt is popular not only with prosecutors but also
with the federal bench. Two distinct pressures keep alive this ap-
proach in the nation's juries.
The first is the very simple desire of prosecutors to diminish the
burden of proof. The prosecutor, who is confronted by a require-
ment of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, is very likely to empha-
size to each juror that there are doubts about doubts. Not all doubts
are strong enough to be "reasonable." An easy demarcation for the
prosecutor to deploy is, at a minimum, a reasonable doubt must be
one the juror can describe aloud. This demarcation is deployed,
sometimes at voir dire'18' and often in closing arguments.- 2
There is another, unrelated phenomenon supporting the idea
that a reasonable doubt should be subject to the assignment of rea-
sons. The test, reasonable doubt-and for that matter its near-corol-
laries, reasonable belief and reasonable suspicion-are in constant
use by the bench in other considerations. In all of the many ways in
which a judge employs such terms to assess judicial determinations,
reasons must be assigned. Thus, judges must assign reasons for con-
cluding that an error in a trial, if it had not occurred, would not have
interfered in a jury's finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. More-
over, the standard is often applied in the review of a criminal trial, in
180 Even thotgh I thought this one up myself, I still think it is correct. I grew
bolstered in this view when I encountered the observations ofJustice Marshall in Ad-
ams v. South Carolina, 464 U.S. 1023, 1026 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting), and Butler
v. South Carolina, 459 U.S. 932 (1982) (Marshall,.J., dissenting). See also infra note 239
and accompanying text.
181 See, e.g, State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8 (La. 1998); McGregor v. State, 885 P.2d
1366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
182 See, e.g., Hall v. State, 820 So. 2d 113 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), afffd, Ex parte Hall,
No. 1990373, 2001 WL 586952 (Ala. June 1, 2001); Brown v. State, 663 A.2d 583 (Md.
Ct. App. 1995); Lord v. State, 806 P.2d 548 (Nev. 1991); State v. Gonzales, 817 P.2d
1186 (N.M. 1991). While many reported appellate opinions contain similar com-
ments, these arguments are rarely grounds for appeal or reversal because in most
states they reflect the law. Therefore such closing comments are much more often
made than are grounds for appeal. It is the opinion of the author that the closing
argument of what is not a reasonable doubt is a prosecutor's stock in trade in most
jurisdictions.
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which the judge must assess beyond a reasonable doubt that there is
error.
The reasons assigned in this manner to judicial findings are the
basis for appellate and collateral review of the relationship between
the premises found and conclusions reached below. On the other
hand, this enterprise should be of little effect on jurors' rationales,
because their findings, particularly in a general verdict, are not sub-
ject to a similarly detailed appeal.
There is also the confusing relationship between reasonable
doubt and reasonable belief. Reasonable belief is, of course, used in
countless areas of the law. A police officer making a warrantless
search must have a reasonable suspicion that the search will yield evi-
dence of a particular crime. 83 A police officer or other person must
have a reasonable belief that a life is in danger in order to use deadly
force. 84 A reasonable belief of consent remains a defense to a charge
of rape. 18 5 Reasonable belief has a significant role in private law18 6
and civil procedure. 8 7
In all of these roles, "reasonable" connotes a very different modi-
fication of its other nouns than it does to "doubt," at least as doubt
began its journey through criminal jury instructions. Reasonableness
in American law generally connotes an objective standard that can be
the basis for a similar understanding by any rational person, as one
sees in both standards of care in tort and their reliable predecessor,
the "reasonable man."'188 Reasonableness in this sense answers the
question of whether good judgment is exercised, according to a host
of variables and not according to whether a reason can be assessed for
the result. In this sense, reasonableness still resonates with the form
of "reasonable" as a description of doubts that undermines moral cer-
tainty. Such reasonable doubts were doubts of reasonable people,
prudent concerns that had gravity but not necessarily a distinct and
183 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968).
184 See, e.g., People v. Barnett, 954 P.2d 384 (Cal. 1998).
185 See Dana Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE
L.J. 2687 (1991).
186 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (making one subject to liability
for supplying a chattel for another to use if the supplier "knows or has reason to
know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the* use for which it is
supplied").
187 Kobzoffv. L.A. County Harbor, 968 P.2d 514 (Cal. 1998) (construing CAL. CIV.
PROC. § 1038).
188 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 11; Randy T. Austin, Comment,
Better Off with the Reasonable Man Dead or the Reasonable Man Did the Darndest Things,
1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 479.
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articulable form. Neither form of reasonableness, however, has other-
wise been reduced to being equated with having reasons.
Granted, one method by which reasonableness is often ascer-
tained is to consider the variables, the circumstances, indeed the rea-
sons for the judgment. But this method is never sufficient, and the
inquiry in other areas of the law remains that reasonableness is to be
determined by the totality of the circumstances. I"
It is possible, of course, that lawyers and judges are so thoughtful
and well educated as to keep apart the sense of reasonableness from a
judgment based upon reasons. Even so, in the rush of a busy docket,
it is also possible that the idea of reasonableness as an objective and
articulable basis of decision may sometimes be confused with the idea
of reasonableness as a matter of prudent concern.
If such confusion does arise, it is then not unsurprising that
judges in its grip will find no difficulty in asserting that a reasonable
doubt held by a juror should be analogous to a reasonable belief by a
policeman, a defendant in tort, or ajudge: it should be articulable. A
juror with a reasonable doubt should be able to describe it as a judge
could; otherwise, the juror simply has a doubt and not a reasonable
one.
V. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: REASONABILE DOUBT ENSHRINED-
OR PETRIFIED
The morass of state instructions on reasonable doubt acquired
even greater complexity when the U.S. Supreme Court announced
that criminal defendants have a constitutional guaranty not to be con-
victed by any lesser standard. The interesting effect of the federal in-
terposition into the already messy arena of the state instructions has
been, perhaps, contrary to the Court's expectations. Rather than giv-
ing greater protection to defendants, the Court has hastened the de-
mise of many of the remaining protections that had persisted despite
the diminished standards of reasonable doubt. l'i °
189 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (examining totality of the
circumstances to determine reasonable suspicion for police stop); Overnite Transp.
Co. v. NLRB, 280 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2002) (examining totality of the circumstances to
determine unfair labor practices). The concept of totality of the circumstances is
itself an outgrowth of the now somewhat obsolete notion of the reasonable man.
190 For the general conclusion that instructions seeking proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt lessened the burden on the state from the older standards of juror cer-
tainty, see Morano, supra note 7, at 527-28.
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A. Reasonable Doubt Becomes Constitutionally Enshrined, and Moral
Certainty Takes a Beating
In 1970, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court accepted Justice
Brennan's position that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the accused in a criminal action from conviction
unless guilt is found beyond a reasonable doubt. ' -" In that case, In re
Winship, New York had set a standard for juvenile criminal proceed-
ings for adjudications of guilt by "a preponderance of the evi-
dence."1 92  Although recognizing special limitations in cases
regarding children, Justice Brennan considered the wider range of
state obligations of fairness in criminal trials. In that light, he asserted
that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt gives a citi-
zen "confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty."' 93 Thus he found "constitutional stature" for a
right of "the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."'19 4
In reaching this conclusion, there is no evidence that the Court
considered other, higher standards; particularly, there is no indica-
tion that the Court considered the idea of reasonable doubt as a lesser
standard than the standard of certainty that was once offered to the
defendants in American courts. Indeed, Justice Brennan not only
equated "utmost certainty" with "proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"
but he also quoted an article for the proposition that "the reasonable-
doubt standard is indispensable, for it 'impresses on the trier of fact
the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in
issue. ' "1 95 That this equivalence might not, even then, be fully the
case seems not to have occurred to him.
Thus, the reasonable-doubt standard entered the constitutional
pantheon with little consideration either of the operation of the stan-
191 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). justice Black, in a formidable dissent, re-
lied largely on historical grounds to assert that nothing in the Due Process Clause
suggests that state legislatures lack the authority to set the burden of proof in their
proceedings. Of course, this approach does not necessarily imply a lesser authority of
the state courts to set such a standard. Interestingly, justice Black believed that the
reasonable-doubt standard had "long been required" in federal criminal trials; it had
then been required for about a century. See id. at 385 (Black, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 360.
193 Id. at 364.
194 Id.
195 Id. (quoting Norman Dorsen & Daniel A. Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of
Juvenile Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. 4, 26 (1967)).
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dard itself or of alternative standards that might give similar or greater
protection to defendants, and with no consideration of the effect of
the instruction on jurors and officials. It is, indeed, possible to con-
sider the eighteenth-century American innovation of jury trial to sug-
gest that a high burden of proof is essential to our constitutional
principle of ordered liberty. Still, the Court did not consider that
such a burden of proof not only would have differed from the stan-
dard of "reasonable doubt" but also would likely have been more pro-
tective of a defendant than reasonable doubt.1 91
At least in part, a failure to grasp fully the many forms of conflict
among the ideas reflected in "reasonable doubt" and its alter egos-
particularly "moral certainty" and "certainty"-has led the Court in
two recent opinions to strike even more deeply against the require-
ment of juror certainty. In Cage v. Louisiana'9 7 and Victor v. Ne-
braska,' "-) the Supreme Court finally entered the tournament lists of
reasonable doubt, not only joining the perennial game of attempting
to define reasonable doubt but also attempting to refine its own stan-
dards to which it will hold other courts in the same tourney. 99 In
196 The author does not assert that principles of ordered liberty are the sole basis
for the identification or recognition of federal constitutional rights. It does seem
odd, though, for the Court to adopt standards that would give less protection to the
citizen. The idea of ordered liberty as a basis for interpreting due process is, of
course, strongly associated with the second Justice Harlan. See Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 176-77 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413, 458 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
616-17 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 28 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)
(Cardozo, J.) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects rights "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty").
197 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
198 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
199 There had been, of course, earlier criticisms of instructions, on which the opin-
ion of the Court had not turned, mainly notices of criticism of similar instructions by
other federal courts. See, e.g.,Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317, 321-22 (1979)
(noting that "reasonable doubt, at a minimum, is one based upon reason. Yet a prop-
erly instructed jury may occasionally convict when it can be said that no rational trier
of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 428 (1979) (noting that the reasonable doubt standard is a "unique standard of
proof not prescribed or defined in the constitution"); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S.
478, 488 (1978) (criticizing the trial court real doubt instruction as a "a substantial
doubt, or real doubt" as being "hardly a model of clarity"). In an echo of two differ-
ent judicial senses of reasonableness, the Court has specified that its review of an
ambiguous instruction is based on "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way" that violates the Constitution.
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,
72 n.4 (1991).
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Cage, the Court struck down a Louisiana instruction that defined rea-
sonable doubt as
one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not
upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such doubt as would give
rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the unsat-
isfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable
doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt.
It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is
required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral
certainty.200
The Court reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court's allowance of
the instruction, singling out the elements of the definition equating
reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty" and "actual substantial
doubt," and requiring jurors to have "moral certainty" of guilt.20 ' The
per curiam opinion noted, "It is plain to us that the words 'substantial'
and 'grave,' as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher de-
gree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable-
doubt standard. 2°1 2 These concerns were compounded by the tradi-
tional reference to moral certainty. In a twist that suggests more than
it clarifies, the Court compared the traditional level of certainty based
on evidence of the senses to something new, "evidentiary certainty":
"[w]hen those statements are then considered with the reference to
'moral certainty,' rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear
that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow
a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by
the Due Process Clause. '203 As a result of the finding of constitutional
infirmity in the instruction, Cage's execution was stayed, although the
state supreme court found that the discredited instruction was harm-
less error,2'14 after which the U.S. Supreme Court announced that in-
firm reasonable-doubt instructions are always harmful error,21 5 and a
new trial was ordered.2 °6
In 1994, the Court revisited the problems of reasonable doubt in
Victor v. Nebraska,20 7 a consolidated case considering jury instructions
from California and Nebraska. Arthur Sandoval had been convicted
200 Cage, 498 U.S. at 40.
201 Id. at 40-41.
202 Id. at 41.
203 Id.
204 State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (La. 1991).
205 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-82 (1993) (unanimous decision).
206 State v. Cage, 580 So. 2d 662 (La. 1991).
207 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
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of a gang-related double homicide. 2018 His jury was instructed using
California's standard instruction, following ChiefJustice Shaw's use of
moral certainty:
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt;,
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state
of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition
that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral cer-
tainty, of the truth of the charge.2 0m9
A Nebraska jury acted on similar instructions to convict Clarence
Victor, a gardener accused of beating and then cutting the throat of
his 82-year-old, part-time employer:
"Reasonable doubt" is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and
prudent person, in one of the graver and more important transac-
tions of life, to pause And hesitate before taking the represented
facts as true and relying and acting thereon, It is such a doubt as
will not permit you, after full, fair, and impartial consideration of all
the evidence, to have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of
the guilt of the accused. At the same time, absolute or mathemati-
cal certainty is not required. You may be convinced of the truth of a
fact beyond a reasonable doubt and yet be fully aware that possibly
you may be mistaken. You may find an accused guilty upon the
strong probabilities of the case, provided such probabilities are strong
enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is reasonable. A rea-
sonable doubt is an actual and substantial doubt reasonably arising
from the evidence, from the facts or circumstances shown by the
evidence, or from the lack of evidence on the part of the State, as
distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare
imagination, or from fanciful conjecture.21 0
Both Sandoval and Victor complained that these instructions vio-
lated the standards of Winship21 ' and Cage,21 2 essentially because the
jury could find that guilt on a standard. lower than the level required
by due process, which by then obligated the jury to find the state has
proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. They argued that the jury
could find moral certainty at a lower threshold, that the jury might
rely on ideas other than evidence in the case to form moral certainty,
that jurors might exclude "mere possible doubts" that should be avail-
208 Id. at 7.
209 Id. (citation omitted).
210 Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
211 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
212 Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
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able to them, and particularly in Victor's case, that the requirement of
"substantial doubt" lowered the state's standard. 213
Justice O'Connor, for the majority, cursorily reviewed the history
of jury instructions, beginning with the Webster opinion, and con-
cluded that Sandoval's and Victor's claims were groundless either be-
cause there was no reasonable likelihood of the jury's mistaking its
task, or because there were alternative definitions of reasonableness to
cure any mistaken notions in the instructions. Particularly as to the
linkage of moral certainty with reasonable doubt, she said, "there is no
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood moral cer-
tainty to be disassociated from the evidence in the case."2 1 4 Further,
and rejecting arguments both on its nineteenth-century meaning and
its current usage, she stated, "We do not think it reasonably likely that
the jury understood the words 'moral certainty' either as suggesting a
standard of proof lower than due process requires or as allowing con-
viction on factors other than the government's proof. -215 Thus, moral
certainty is not constitutionally forbidden from use as an understand-
ing of the state's burden of proof to the jury. Justice O'Connor
continued,
At the same time, however, we do not condone the use of the
phrase. As modern dictionary definitions of moral certainty attest,
the common meaning of the phrase has changed since it was used
in the Webster instruction, and it may continue to do so to the point
that it conflicts with the Winship standard.2 16
This consideration of the dictionary usage as a basis for determin-
ing the meaning of the standard of proof, is, in some regard, problem-
atic. Although she considered the etymological transitions of the
meaning of "moral certainty," it is interesting to note that she did not
consider a similar examination of a parallel evolution of the meaning
of "reasonable." Moreover, the very fact of resort to a dictionary sug-
gests the intersection of the lay vocabulary with legal arcana.
2 17
In short, the majority of the Court considered the instructions to
be questionable.2 8 Even so, the convictions were not overturned. 21"
213 Victor, 511 U.S. at 14-22.
214 Id. at 16.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 For these points, I am grateful to the insights of Philip Hamburger and Dick
Helmholz.
218 Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg each concurred, emphasizing their concerns
over the language of the instructions:
Though the reference to "moral certainty" is not much better, California's
use of "moral evidence" is the most troubling, and to me seems quite in-
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Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Souter, dissented, arguing
that the instruction was too similar to that struck in Cage to be distin-
guished.220 Further, he argued that the use in the instruction of
"grave" and "substantial" doubt and of "strong probabilities," as well as
language about moral certainty and the hesitation to act, not only
were likely to confuse jurors but also were likely to overstate the de-
gree of doubt required to acquit. 22'
Despite disagreement on similarities between the allowed Victor
and disallowed Cage instructions, the one point on which all of the
opinions were agreed was that "moral certainty" was confusing and
ought to be removed. Indeed, lower courts considering similar in-
structions have begun reaching exactly this conclusion.222 Thus, it is
perhaps unsurprising to find that California has modified its pattern
defensible. The derivation of the phrase is explained in the Court's opinion,
but even with this help the term is a puzzle. And for jurors who have not
had the benefit of the Court's research, the words will do nothing but baffle.
1(. at 23 (KennedyJ., concurring). Justice Ginsburg stated, "I agree, further, with the
Court's suggestion that the term 'moral certainty,' while not in itself so misleading as
to render the instructions unconstitutional, should be avoided as an unhelpful way of
explaining what reasonable doubt means." Id. at 24 (GinsburgJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
219 This was not the first time the Court had reached this result. Justice StephenJ.
Field, in Hlopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887), had concltded that there was no real
difference between moral certainty and reasonable doubt in the instruction, but the
Court did not strike it down. His argument of the idea he believed to which each was
proxy is instructive:
The instruction in the case before us is asjust a guide to practical men as can
well be given; and if it were open to criticism it could not have misled the
jury, when considered in connection with the further charge, that if they
could reconcile the evidence with any reasonable hypothesis consistent with
the defendant's innocence they should do so, and in that case find him not
guilty. The evidence must satisfy thejudgment of the jurors as to the guilt of
the defendant, so as to exclude any other reasonable concltsion.
Id. at 441.
220 Victor, 511 U.S. at 28, 31-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
221 Id. at 33-34 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222 See, for example, Morris v. Cain, 186 F.3d 581, 586 (5th Cir. 1999), in which
the court granted habeas, applying Cage and Victor to overturn this instruction:
However, this doubt must be a reasonable one, that is, one that is founded
upon a real, tangible, and substantial basis and not upon mere caprice, fancy
or conjecture. It must be such a doubt as would give rise to a grave uncer-
tainty raised in your mind by reason of the unsatisfactory character of the
evidence or the lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible
doubt. It is an actual or substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable
man would seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or math-
ematical certainty but a moral certainty.
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instructions in Victor's wake, removing moral certainty from the
charge. 223 It is likewise unsurprising that the lower courts have con-
tinued to disagree on the constitutional sufficiency of various formule
of reasonable doubt, particularly those dealing with moral cer-
tainty. 22 4 The confusion is, if anything, even greater in considering
the role of articulability.
B. The Difficulties of Articulability Continue
If the differences between Cage and Victor illustrate nothing else,
they are stark reminders of the small variants in definitions of reasona-
ble doubt that alter the result for a majority on the Court. But the
Court is not the only source of our understandings of "reasonable,"
and the term enjoys a wide play in the culture.
In this century's culture, as much as in the Court, there has been
drift in the language. When someone says "that is reasonable," it is
now less likely that this person means "that is a good judgment" or
"that is based on the faculty of reason." "That is reasonable" often
now means "I see you have your reasons."
In the realms of both law and popular usage, a strong linkage
continues between reason and identification, such that a reasonable
doubt must be identifiable, quantifiable, and at the least articulable.
A contrary approach continues to find adherents to a view that asserts
reasonableness is incapable of further definition, resisting the tug to
relate the reasonable as the articulable. Thus, while articulability as a
requirement of reasonable doubt has generally succeeded in Ameri-
can evidentiary, criminal, and constitutional law, there is a split in the
circuits on this issue.
In Vargas v. Keane,225 the Second Circuit upheld an instruction
that described reasonable doubt as "doubt for which you can give a
Id., discussed in Marty Solomon, Note, Morris v. Cain: The Fifth Circuit Sidesteps the
AEDPA and Strikes Down a Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1153
(2000).
223 See 2 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTFIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNT1Y, CAL., Part 17, Concluding Instructions G., Concluding
Instructions (i) Restitution and Verdict, Appendix B Reasonable Doubt-The California Experi-
ence (1996), in CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL (6th ed. 1996).
224 Compare Schneider v. Day, 73 F.3d 610 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding moral certainty
instruction not unconstitutional), and Harvell v. Nagle, 58 F.3d 1541 (11th Cir. 1995)
(same), with Simpson v. Matesanz, 29 F. Stipp. 2d 11 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding moral
certainty instruction unconstitutional), and Austin v. Bell, 938 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D.
Tenn., 1996) (same).
225 86 F.3d 1273 (2d Cir. 1996).
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reason if called upon to do so by a fellow juror in the jury room. '"226
The court, however, came to the interesting conclusion that, when
viewed in context, the language of the instruction "simply does not
suggest that a doubt formulated within one's own mind-reasonable,
but not articulable-is insufficient for acquittal."22 7
Despite its efforts to construe away a conflict in the circuits, the
Fifth Circuit en banc split with the Second Circuit. In Humphrey v.
Cain,228 the circuit doing the most business in death cases rejected an
instruction that required jurors to think of reasonable doubt as
one founded upon a real, tangible, substantial basis, and not upon
mere caprice, fancy or conjecture. It must be such a doubt as would
give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your minds by reason of
the unsatisfactory character of the evidence; one that would make
you feel that you had not an abiding conviction to a moral certainty
of the defendant's guilt. If, after giving a fair and impartial consid-
eration to all of the facts in the case, you find the evidence unsatis-
factory upon any single point indispensably necessary to constitute
the defendant's guilt, this Would give rise to such a reasonable
doubt as would justify you in rendering a verdict of not guilty ...
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It should be an
actual or substantial doubt. It is such a doubt as a reasonable man
Would seriously entertain. It is a serious doubt, for which you could
give good reason. 2 9-
The three-judge panel found that the instruction "lightens the
state's burden and removes a substantial protection assured defend-
ants,"2 30 and the panel's reasoning was adopted by a majority of the
court en banc.2 3 1 A dissent from the en banc ruling, filed by Judge
Edith Jones and three of her colleagues, including the redoubtable
Judge E. Grady Jolly, Jr., argued that this instruction held neither of
the two vices that render a reasonable-doubt instruction unconstitu-
226 Id. at 1277-79.
227 Id. at 1278. The Second Circuit had previously upheld an instruction demand-
ing articulability: "a doubt for which some good reason can be given." Chalmers v.
Mitchell, 73 F.3d 1262, 1266 (2d Cir. 1996). But see Chief Judge Newman's dissent,
id. at 1274-76 (Newman, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the instruction).
228 120 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 935, 943 (1998) (supporting the reasoning of the three-judge
panel, but adopting a different reasoning and overruling precedent).
229 Humphrey, 120 F.3d at 528.
230 Id. at 530.
231 Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552 (1997) (en banc). For a later application, see
Tyler v. Cain, No. 97-G1549, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14591, at *5-6 (E.D. La. Sept. 8,
1998) (giving the same jury instruction as in Humphrey, but the application was filed
too late to apply Hiumphrey precedent).
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tional: it neither urged the jury to convict on a standard of proof
lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt," nor permitted the jury to go
outside the record of evidence to convict. 232
The struggle of the courts of appeals in Vargas and Humphrey to
determine the role of articulability in the reasonable-doubt instruc-
tion illustrates well the problems of the federal courts in examining
the instructions, both on direct appeal and collateral review. Strictly
in the light of the Supreme Court's elements of a forbidden instruc-
tion in Cage but the allowed instruction in Victor, it would seem that
the Second Circuit and the dissenters of the Fifth Circuit are quite
right to say that these instructions are within the limits of due process.
On the other hand, the majority of the Fifth Circuit's Humphrey panel
has a much clearer understanding of the problem of reasonable
doubt than has been shown by the Supreme Court thus far.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, addressing the issue at about the
same time as the Second and Fifth Circuits, although not considering
the question as one of due process, upheld that state's long-standing
rejection of the articulable doubt instruction.2 3 3 The court noted that
"[j]urors may harbor a valid reasonable doubt even if they cannot
explain the reason for the doubt."234
This observation by the New Jersey Supreme Court, and similar
understandings by the Fifth Circuit, recognize the nature of a contro-
versy seemingly unknown to the legion of scholars to consider the in-
struction as a whole. The articulable doubt instruction is widespread,
accepted in at least a dozen jurisdictions.235 Even so, few scholars con-
232 Humphrey, 138 F.3d at 554 (Jones, J., dissenting).
233 State v. Medina, 685 A.2d 1242, 1246 (N.J. 1996) (citing State v. Vaszorich, 98
A.2d 299 (N.J. 1953)).
234 Id.
235 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Robbio, 186 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1999) (involving habeas appeal for federal conviction in
Rhode Island); Simpson v. Matesanz, 175 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1999) (reviewing Massa-
chusetts state instruction on habeas); United States v. Chester, No. 95-5446, No. 95-
5510, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 23558 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 1997) (unpublished) (involving
direct appeal of federal conviction in South Carolina); United States v. Taylor, 997
F.2d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Harmon v. People, No. 97-CV-2539, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20735 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2001) (applying Keane to New York state instruction on
habeas) (unpublished); United States v. Terlingo, No. 99-525-06, 99-525-07, 99-525-08,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5709 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2001) (unpublished); Drayton v. Evatt,
No. 2: 94-1608-23, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22174 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 1998) (involving
habeas review of state conviction and order of death); People v. Sherman, No.
98CA2254, 2001 Colo. App. LEXIS 1674 (Oct. 11, 2001) (unpublished); State v.
O'Neil, 789 A.2d 531 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); People v. Scott, No. 216500, 2001 Mich.
App. LEXIS 933 (May 29, 200i) (unpublished); Washington v.Jones, No. 19778-6-111,
2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 28 (Jan. 8, 2002) (unpublished).
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sider it when examining the difficulties posed by reasonable doubt,
being still distracted more by the largely moot questions posed by the
moral certainty instruction. 2 6
C. Arliculable Doubt and the Presumption of Innocence
The deepest question is whether the articulable doubt instruction
lowers the burden of proof the state must meet, or even reverses the
burden of persuasion, to convict below the constitutional limits set in
Winship. The Court, only five years after Winship, appeared to make
explicit the long understood link between the burden of proof and
the burden of persuasion, holding that the state must prove all of the
elements of an indictment by a proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
2 7
This case, however, did not concern itself with an articulable doubt
instruction.
The First Circuit struck down an articulable doubt instruction in
1978, however, finding that the instruction reversed the burden of
persuasion. 2  Also, for this reason, Justices Marshall and Brennan
dissented from two death case denials of habeas, in which Justice Mar-
shall noted the conflict between this view by the First Circuit and
other state courts and the view by South Carolina and other articul-
able-doubt states warranted certiorari to consider whether the articul-
able doubt standard would reverse the burden of persuasion.2 3 9 This
236 See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 5. Corwin inventories instructions based on moral
certainty, the double inference, substantial doubt, and hesitation to act, but does not
consider the doubt for which a reason can be given. Id. at 840-43. As noted above,
Mulrine offers a rare consideration of the articulable doubt instruction, presenting it,
however, solely as a matter of Canadian law. See Mulrine, supra note 5, at 216-17.
237 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975). For an analysis of the rela-
tionship of reasonable doubt to the presumption of innocence in Mullaney, see
Sundby, supna note 3 at 466-69.
238 Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
The court's "definition of reasonable doubt was the exact inverse of what it should
have been. Instead of requiring the government to prove guilt, it called upon peti-
tioners to establish doubt in the jurors' minds. That is an inescapable violation of In
re Winship." Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
239 See Adams v. South Carolina, 464 U.S. 1023, 1026, nn.3-4 (1983) (Marshall,J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari, with Brennan, 1., joining) (citing Taylor v. Ken-
tucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488 (1978); Pettine v. Territory of New Mexico, 201 F. 489,
495-97 (8th Cir. 1912); Laird v. State, 476 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Ark. 1972); State v. Der-
rico, 434 A.2d 356, 367-68 (Conn. 1980); Stirparo v. State, 287 A.2d 394 (Del. 1972);
State v. Osbey, 517 P.2d 141, 148 (Kan. 1973); State v. Davis, 482 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Mo.
1972); Frazier v. State, 100 S.W. 94, 102-03 (Tenn. 1907); Owens v. Commonwealth,
43 S.E.2d 895, 902 (Va. 1947); State v. McDonald, 571 P.2d 930, 940 (Wash. 1977));
see aL'o Butler v. South Carolina, 459 U.S. 932, 932 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certioriari).
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argument has been raised at least three times in recent years in the
appellate courts, which have rejected it without analysis.2 411 It has yet
to be addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court's failing should not be surprising, given its continuing,
historically incomplete consideration of the meaning of "reason,"
"doubt," and the role of certainty of guilt by the jury. The Court has
yet to recognize that it has allowed a "reasonable" doubt to become
synonymous with an articulable doubt, that a "reasonable doubt" is no
longer a doubt held by a reasonable person, and that it is very far from
a private judgment. As a result, the Court has left a sufficiently ambig-
uous direction to the lower courts that a requirement on jurors to
articulate a doubt does not necessarily reduce the standard the Court
has theoretically protected. The Vargas and the Humphrey dissenters
are correctly following the lead of the current Court, even if the
Humphrey majority is still correct in asserting the lowering of the stan-
dard from the early protections of reasonable doubt. By allowing the
burden of proof to drift with changes in the meaning of reason, the
Court tacitly has accepted lower burdens of proof.
VI. TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES: DOUBTS ABOUT
REASONABIE DOUBT
By the end of the nineteenth century, "proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt" had become the ubiquitous standard for criminal trials in
America. While there had been a considerable wrangle of cases at-
tempting to refine this definition, there was still little concern that it
240 See State v. Medina, 685 A.2d 1242, 1246 (N.J. 1996), in which the charge that
the instruction reverses the burden of persuasion was rejected but in the midst of a
holding that the charge diminished the burden of proof; see also the tantalizing case
People v. Jackson, 564 N.E.2d 652 (N.Y. 1990), in Vvhich the New York Court of Appeals
refused to hear an argument that the articulable doubt instruction lowered the bur-
den of persuasion, finding that the objection at trial in which, "[c]ounsel argued that
such an instruction punished less articulate people on the jury, who might vote guilty
'because of the charge * * * which says they should be able to articulate their reason'"
did not preserve the issue for appeal of whether "the court's definition and illustra-
tion diluted the People's burden of proof by conveying a requirement that the doubt-
ingjuror must give reasons and must support those reasons with evidence." Id. at 653.
The refusal to consider whether articulable doubt lowers the state's burden of
persuasion concerned Judge Titone when the New York Court of Appeals again re-
fused to address the issue in 1995. Writing in dissent, he argued that although the
trial court correctly charged the jury with the state's burden of persuasion, an im-
proper reasonable doubt charge containing an articulability standard, which they
heard after it, diluted the effect of the persuasion charge. People v. Fields, 660
N.E.2d 1134, 1136-37 (N.Y. 1995) (Titone,J., dissenting).
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was not appropriate to the task of protecting innocent defendants
from conviction. That complacency did not last as a universal matter.
In retrospect, we may discern five bases for increased criticism of
the idea of reasonable doubt. The first is that, for all of its acceptance
in the culture, it was unnecessary to the function of the juror: jurors
did not need to be told how to exercise judgment. The second is its
ambiguous nature: there are too many potential types of juror unrea-
sonableness and too many types of unreasonable or reasonable doubt.
The third is its culturally contingent limit: the idea of a common form
of reason as an essential basis of judgment has become increasingly
contested. The fourth is inherent in the idea of reasonableness as it
has passed into the culture of language usage: the fine distinction be-
tween reason as a form of judgment and reason as a datum has largely
disappeared.
The fifth reason is one that flows from the above four. One of
the effects of the reasonable-doubt instruction, in the light of these
four changes of perception, is to alter the presumption of innocence.
A. Wigmoreans and the Instruction
At the beginning of the twentieth century, even before the gen-
eral adoption of articulability into the standard of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, concerns arose about the fitness of the formula as a
basis for the jury's obligation. Although these concerns took numer-
ous forms, they were, in sum, a recognition that the instruction was
unnecessary, that a juror could employ more direct means of judging
between sufficient certainty and sufficient doubt.
After all, in the late 1800s, the jury's obligation to find whether
the state had proved "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" was then still a
relatively new invention and was not yet thought of as a monolith or as
the false antique it has become. Rather, it was still in competition with
the older obligation that the jury be convinced of the guilt of the de-
fendant. For legal writers who were conversant with the theory of
moral evidence and moral proof, "reasonable doubt" was still a partic-
ularly questionable modification of the fundamental obligation that
the jury be morally certain of the guilt of the defendant. Moreover, as
jurisdictions were increasingly beginning to use reasonable doubt, un-
moored from its converse relationship to moral certainty, it became
the sole point of definition in the juror's evaluation of the case. Such
reliance was bound to cause concern, and it did.
John Henry Wigmore spilled notes across page after page of his
vaunted treatise, detailing criticisms and concerns about reasonable
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doubt. 24  His complaint about this "elusive and undefinable state of
mind" was essentially that, despite the barrels of "ill-advised" prece-
dent parsing carefully among the types of reasonableness that are ac-
ceptable and those that are not, the instructions were failures: "when
anything more than a simple caution and a brief definition is given,
the matter tends to become one of mere words, and the actual effect
upon the jury, instead of being enlightenment, is rather confusion, or,
at the least, a continued incomprehension. '" 242 The function of pro-
moting a truth-finding function never entered into it.243
The primary effects of reasonable-doubt instructions, as Wigmore
saw them, were to allow for legalistic quibbling and arguments on ap-
peal. Moreover, the continuous attempts to resolve the meaning of
reasonableness just made matters worse: "The effort to perpetuate
and develop these elaborate unserviceable definitions is a useless one,
and serves to-day chiefly to aid the purposes of the tactician. It should
be abandoned." 244
An ally of Wigmore's in his quest to overturn reasonable doubt
proved to be William Trickett, a law professor at Dickinson, who in
1906 mounted a comprehensive attack on the idea of reasonable
doubt,245 an attack wholly endorsed by Wigmore. 2 46 Trickett noted
that the juror's burden of ascertaining a reasonable doubt required
the juror to perform two distinct functions. The juror "must have the
doubt and be the critic of it. ' ' 247 To Trickett, this dual role was
absurd:
What man ever entertained a doubt, which at the time. [sic] he be-
lieved to be unreasonable? To be convinced that a doubt of a fact is
unreasonable, is to believe the fact. To tell a man that if he believes
beyond a reasonable doubt, he must do so and so, is to tell him that
if he believes beyond reasonably not believing, he is to do so and so,
a valuable instruction surely!248
241 5 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 2497.
242 5 id.
243 This very realist appraisal was certainly fitting for its time.
244 5 id.
245 See William Trickett, Preponderance of Evidence and Reasonable Doubt, 10 FORUM
75 (1906).
246 See John Henry Wigmore, Letter from Prof. Wigmore, 10 FORUM 170 (1906). Wig-
more exulted in Trickett's analysis and reprinted long excerpts from the article in
later editions of his treatise. See5 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 2497, at 468-69, 471-72.
247 Trickett, supra note 244, at 81.
248 d. at 81-82. Trickett continued in the same vein to criticize instructions that
doubts should arise from the evidence, that they must not be fancied, nor conjured
up, nor raised to escape rendering an unpleasant verdict, but must be honest, as
would cloud a judgment, and dealt with as an important matter. Id. at 82-84.
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This criticism at first might appear to be based on Trickett's ac-
ceptance of a view that doubt is the opposite of certainty, yet this ap-
proach was rejected in criticizing Shaw's formulation in Webster, whose
view seemingly required that all levels of belief below certainty be the
same as doubt.249 Trickett deployed a different potential meaning of
reasonable doubt as well, suggesting that one meaning of such instruc-
tions might be that the doubt might arise on reflection, disturbing an
earlier conviction.2 50
In the end, Trickett found no comfort in any attempt to clarify
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Rather, he reduced all of the ac-
cretions to ChiefJustice Shaw's opinion, paring it down to a statement
of remarkable clarity, which had an antiquity of which even the care-
ful Professor Trickett seems to have been glibly unaware: "before con-
victing [someone] of a crime ajuror should be morally certain that he
committed it, and this conviction should be the result of a serious
consideration of all the evidence." 25'
Some of the problems Trickett identified are inevitable. A juror
who must reach ajudgment if it is beyond a reasonable doubt must be
able to assess, somehow, what this means. A sincere effort to assess
this meaning, whether or not it uses all of the additional terms thrown
in from the bench, must require determining which doubts are and
which are not reasonable. Whether the court falls back on tricks of
articulation, as is often done, or just emphatically and enigmatically
restates the standard, the juror is left to assess the sufficiency not of
the doubt but of the reasonableness of the doubt.
One problem with the articulability instruction would become
more obvious as it grew in frequency of use-its effect on the pre-
sumption of innocence. Wigmore's attack on the reasonable-doubt
instruction as a confusion may also be seen in his concern for clarify-
ing the state's burden of persuasion. Wigmore's powerful argument
to solidify the presumption of innocence was borne of the same in-
stinct.2 52 This argument bore fruit in the U.S. Supreme Court in
249 Id. at 85. Despite Trickett's seeming unfamiliarity with the neo-Lockean idea
of moral certainty, his result is, in fact, correct.
25) Id. at 84.
251 i. at 86.
252 SeeJohn H. Wigmore, The Presumption of Innocence in Criminal Cases, reprinted in
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
551, 559 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1898). Wigmore is carrying a banner held aloft
by Greenleaf in his treatise. See SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THlE LAW OF Evi-
DENCE 42-43 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1850). Wigmore's and GreenleaFs success
is evident in Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895) (citing 5 GREENLEAF, supra
note 113).
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1895, when a right to a presumption of innocence in federal criminal
cases was based on foundations in civil law, canon law, and the com-
mon law.2 53 In that opinion, Justice Douglass Edward White made
clear that, despite the commentators who had implied the reasonable-
doubt standard and presumption of innocence were synonymous, the
two standards were quite different and independently pursued the
same goal of ensuring the justice of the proceeding. 254
B. The Multiplicity of Meanings for Reasonable Doubt I.- As Judgment of
a Reasonable Juror
Reasonable doubt, even when seen solely as doubt by reasonable
jurors, suffers from an inevitable ambiguity. According to one view,
such ambiguity has a benefit to the legal system, by allowing jurors to
be flexible in determining the requisite degree of proof that the state
must produce. 255 Even so, the jurors are instructed that they do not
have this license, by giving them an instruction on both the presump-
tion of innocence and on the burden of proof itself. Further, when
compared to the goal of accuracy, such a view fails to take into ac-
count the increased likelihood of a false conviction that accompanies
trials for serious crimes.256
From the discussion in Parts II through IV above, it appears that
there has been a broad evolution of the idea of reasonable doubt.
This evolving notion of reasonable jurors is, at least at first blush, one
in keeping with cultural expectations ofjustice. On closer inspection,
253 Coffin, 156 U.S. at 446-60. In 1877, the Court had implied that the govern-
ment must always have the burden of persuasion, although it stopped short of an-
nouncing a defendant's right to an instruction on presumption of innocence.
Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 266 (1877) (citing, inter alia, Com-
monwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 305 (1850)).
The historical origins of the presumption itself are inventoried in the opinion.
For a more comprehensive discussion, see Joseph C. Cascarelli, Presumption of Inno-
cence and Natural Law: Machiavelli and Aquinas, 41 A. J. JuRIs. 229 (1996); and
Fletcher, supra note 139, at 892 (providing a comparative and historical study). For
discussion of the procedural developments of canon law that included not only the
development of the presumption of innocence but also the closely related right
against self-incrimination, see KENNETH PENNINCTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW,
1200-1600: SOVEREIGNTV AND RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 157-60
(1993); and R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of
the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1990).
254 See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 460-61. White was then an Associate Justice; he was
appointed Chief Justice in 1910.
255 See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002).
256 See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996).
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however, differing conceptions of reason remain in play, which vary
according to what exactly one is being reasonable about or who is
being reasonable. Reasonable jurors, reasonable rules, and reasona-
ble doubts each call to mind a different sense of the form of reason in
play. Given that the earliest conceptions of reason in the juror's role
was simply that ajudgment must be reached by a reasonable decision-
maker,257 a brief inventory of this evolution of ideas of a reasonable
juror might be in order.
Anachronistically, the reasonable juror was initially one steeped
in local knowledge. For centuries, juries were drawn from small com-
munities in which occurred the criminal act or lived the criminal de-
fendant. Jurors were expected to know enough of the backgrounds of
the participants to act as sources of evidence themselves. 25 8 As jurors
began to be drawn from a wider geography and as new rules of evi-
dence excluded those with prior knowledge of the case from the jury,
the jury's role became one only ofjudgment and not of witness. Thus,
one of the earliest ways of speaking of juror reasonableness, the sense
of fitness by local knowledge, became obsolete. Of course, this obso-
lescence is limited to the juror's role as an adjudicator of fact at arm's
length. There is a continuing sense that a reasonable juror would be
sufficiently familiar with the culture of thejurisdiction to comprehend
and assess culturally contingent meanings of evidence in the case.
More in keeping with the predicates to the understanding of reason
in the seventeenth century, the "reasonable" juror possesses the tools
of reason, being capable of the memory, imagination, understanding,
and communication necessary for adult participation in the culture.
More specifically to the reasonable person in the neo-Lockean sense
of the eighteenth century, the reasonable juror is practical, capable of
being satisfied by evidence to "moral certainty." Within the broader
confines of the jury instructions of the early twentieth century, the
reasonable juror is capable of deciding the facts on the basis of the
evidence introduced into the case and is a sober person, who takes as
important the cause before the court and the potential burden on the
defendant and to society.
These shifts in the meaning of the reasonable juror correspond
with the shifts in the manner of selection at the commencement of
the trial, the process of voir dire. This process, as is well known, does
not in fact concentrate on proving these elements ofjuror responsibil-
ity or fitness to the court. It is rather designed to assess venire mem-
257 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
258 See BAKER, supra note 8, at 88.
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bers through challenges to their fitness. This is especially the case in
more serious criminal trials. 259
An unreasonable juror can be depicted on a variety of grounds,
which are largely the converse of the bases of reasonableness.
Anachronistically, a "reasonable" juror would have no basis for judg-
ing the defendant or evidence from local knowledge. The unreasona-
ble in the seventeenth-century view would be one who judges the
defendant according to metaphysical or religious, or other non-practi-
cal bases. Correspondingly, the unreasonable juror of the eighteenth
century might well have been a radical skeptic, an unadulterated
Humean, who acted in the belief that there was no such thing as cer-
tainty. The current incarnation of unreasonable juror, in the
broadest sense of the current instructions, is one who weighs the evi-
dence with prejudice, giving significance or insignificance to evidence
based on origins of the evidence related to class, race, gender, and
other distinctions that are not related to the fit of the evidence with
the issues of the case. In a narrower sense, the reasonable juror per-
sists as an ideal, the "rational trier of fact" employed by appellate and
habeas courts to measure the effect of an error in criminal cases.2 11
These general notions of reasonableness stand in some contrast
to the more specific questions of reasonableness that have dogged the
instruction of reason as a basis for doubt. The essential idea of the
reasonable juror, as opposed to the reasonable doubt, has evolved to
reflect altered social conventions. Yet, the degree to which one no-
tion or another of what is reason is both indefinable and, potentially,
in conflict.
C. The Multiplicity of Meanings for Reasonable Doubt II: As a Modifier
of Doubts
A closely related basis for the ambiguity of reasonable doubt is
the sheer number of ways in which it came to be, probably inevitably,
understood at the bar. By 1897, the editors of the Decennial Digest
were comfortable identifying not less than eighteen different formule
for reasonable-doubt instructions, of which eleven were generic to all
forms of proof and distinct in their definitions of the operation of
259 There are special limits on the beliefs of jurors qualified through voir dire to
serve in capital crimes. It might not be unfair to say that jurors who hold such beliefs
are unreasonable in the context of the capital jury, particularly as disqualification on
these grounds are often for religious, moral, or sentimental beliefs that may not be
analytically rational by all definitions of reason. That said, this sense of fitness for a
jury seems rather distant from the notion of reasonableness.
260 For a paradigmatic approach of this test, see Judge William Barbour, Jr.'s opin-
ion in Lockett v. Puckett, 980 F. Supp. 201, 227 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
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reason.26 1 Besides general admonitions and a continuing series of
cases holding that reasonable doubt ought not or cannot be defined,
these definitions amounted to the following:
1. Reasonable doubt is strong, real, substantial, or well-founded
doubt.
2. Reasonable doubt is the opposite of moral certainty.
3. Reasonable doubt is the opposite of an abiding conviction in
the defendant's guilt.
4. Reasonable doubt must be a conscientious belief.
5. Reasonable doubt must be a doubt or belief that can be held as
men.
6. Reasonable doubt must be strong enough as a doubt that would
influence an action in private affairs.
7. Reasonable doubt must be a doubt for which a reason can be
given.
8. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires more than a suspi-
cion or probability of guilt.
9. Reasonable doubt requires more than a probability or supposi-
tion of innocence.
10. Reasonable doubt requires more than a possibility of
innocence.
11. Reasonable doubt can be based on any fact.
It is important in looking over these captions to recall that they
are rarely exclusive of one another and that there has been through-
out the century considerable disagreement among the states, and at
different times in the same state, over the validity of any one defini-
tion. Furthermore, this eighteen-point schematic holding eleven
forms of doubt was not meant even by West to suggest a talismanic
meaning. Indeed, West's own mid-century "Words and Phrases" pro-
vided no less than thirty-one divisions to inventory different usages.2 62
D. As a Contingent View of Judgment, Reasonableness Is Controversial
Courts and their advisers continue to struggle both to define rea-
sonable doubt and to define the contours of its place in jurors' in-
261 6 WEST'S AMERICAN DIGEST 1897-1908, DECENNIAL EDITION 1111-28 (1908)
(Criminal Law, Key Number 789). There were, of course, a wide range of specific
instructions digested relating to the evidence of particular types of offense, as well as
many cases, occupying several categories of the digest entry, determining the neces-
sary or discretionary nature of the instruction. The West Company has maintained its
eighteen-point division of this entry unto the present day. See, e.g., 6 WEST'S AMERICAN
DIGEST, PART 2, 1991-1996, DECENNIAL EDITION 1400-31 (1997).
262 See Wisr's WORDS AND PHRASES 483-544 (1962).
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struction. The Florida and California instructions, which are
reproduced in an appendix to this Article, are typical of the genre.
One response to this imprecision mounted by legal scholars
under the influences of game theory and of law and economics in the
1970s and 1980s was to reduce the degree to which the juror was ex-
pected to rule on the case as a whole, by providing mathematical ap-
proaches to all of the subsidiary evidentiary questions. 263 The result
would be to reduce the questions of a case to components, none of
which was prone to a holistic conception of reasonable certainty or
reasonable doubt. While this new school of evidence attracted consid-
erable initial controversy before moderating itself into less controver-
sial statements, it has continued,' 64 despite powerful attacks against it
by the likes of Larry Tribe, who have defended juror judgment as a
holistic exercise, based in part on a juror's ability to determine guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. 265
The recurrent attempts by the lawyers to employ definitions of
reason as a basis for the laymen's doubt have two clear connotations,
both of which are the basis for considerable suspicion for those who
follow critical scholarship. First, in the words of Pierre Schlag, they
are "language games about language games."266 The need to define
limit, (doubt) by limit 2 (reasonable) by limit 3 (grave) or limit 4 (com-
mon sense) or limit 5 (articulable: that you can say it aloud) is a self-
referential game. Once we move beyond one limit, the justifications
for each limit are the other justifications. The very fact, however, that
these justifications of limit 2 are so alluring to the lawyers in talking to
the jury does not just illustrate the uselessness of limit3 through limit5.
They are also illustrative of the justificatory enterprise as a whole. In
other words, the law is drawn to use reason to justify and control its
delegation of power in the juror. But this justification must itself be
justified, hence giving rise to the smoke and mirrors about what "rea-
sonable" must mean here. These further justifications have no essen-
tial basis, and eventually the screen fades to black, with the law having
263 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968); Robert L. Birmingham, A Model of Criminal Process: Game Theory and
Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 57 (1970); Kenneth S. Broun & Douglas G. Kelly, Playing the
Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 ILL. L.F. 23 (1970); Michael 0. Finkelstein &
William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REV. 489
(1970); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065
(1968). This approach was not truly novel in this age. See Note, Evidential Use of
Mathematically Determined Probability, 28 HARV. L. REV. 693, 695-96 (1915).
264 William Twining, The New Evidence Scholarship, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 295 (1991).
265 Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HARV. L. REX'. 1329, 1375 (1971).
266 PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 86 (1998).
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made no better claim either for the juror to make decisions of guilt or
for limits of reason on that power than the simple assertion thatjurors
have that power.
The second connotation is one of anachronism. The idea of rea-
son, as a qualification for judgment or as a basis for knowledge, is not
what it was three hundred years ago. If reason means anything in to-
day's common culture, it is closest to the strain of cases demanding
that what is reasonable is articulable. To be reasonable is to have a
reason, and to have a reason is to be able to state a reason.2 67
Beyond the views of critical and economic scholars, the idea of
articulability as a necessary condition for knowledge or judgment is
inevitably beyond the limits of language and knowledge.2 6s Modern
philosophy has presented many arguments against the seventeenth-
century view of knowledge and the idea that there is a common or
even real sense of usage in which "reason" has a fixed meaning.269
267 This relationship between reasonableness and articulability echoes the argu-
ments that one's view of reason is contingent on language made by Johann Georg
Hamann and, especially, Johann Gottfried von Herder. Their arguments did not,
however, require the utter reduction of reason to expression. See ISAIA I BERLIN, VIco
AND HERDER: Two STUDIES IN TlE HISTORY OF IDEAS 153-56 (1976) (noting Herder's
rejection, under Hamann's influence, of disconnected theoretical frameworks).
268 The need for articulability in the exercise of judgment on the bench has al-
ready been mentioned. See supra text accompanying note 227. The need for an ap-
pearance of concreteness, for the legitimacy that comes of an appearance of sturdy
institutions is a strong lure in legal authors' descriptions of their task. See SC:ILAG,
supra note 266, at 120-40. There are more extreme views of the dangers of law's
"irrational worship of rationality," particularly in the judicial assignment of reasons.
See PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERIKAN LAW (1998). This desire
for articulability and concreteness is part of the price that must be paid for the law's
rejection of Hume's skeptical view at the dawn of reasonable doubt. Other fields have
moved on:
"In the study of ideas, it is necessary to remember that insistence on hard-
headed clarity issues from sentimental feeling, as it were a mist, cloaking the
perplexities of fact. Insistence on clarity at all costs is based on sheer super-
stition as to the mode in which human intelligence functions. Our reason-
ings grasp at straws for premises and float on gossamers for deductions."
Oswald Spengler, Meaning of Numbers, in 4J.R. NEWMAN, THE WORLD OF MATHEMAICS
2315 (1956) (quoting Alfred North Whitehead).
269 Perhaps the most powerful arguments remain the Romantic arguments that
there are multiple conceptions of reason, each contingent on culture and language.
These trace their origins from von Herder to Wittgenstein. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN,
THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM (Henry Hardy ed., 1999). Beyond these nationalistic and
linguistic arguments against a universal conception of reason, many twentieth-century
philosophers were critical of most models of reason as failing to respond to some
necessary element of subjectivism. See, e.g.,JOHN DEWEY, Ti-i: QUEST FOR CERTAIN-Y: A
STUDY OF THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTrION (1929); KARL R. POPPER, OBJEC-
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Some of these arguments flow from a resurgent strength in neo-
Humean views, and many more have developed from an increasingly
sophisticated understanding of the mind. Some are simply pragmatic
recognitions of practical limitations.2711
At the least, these views recognize a considerable gap between
reasons and reasonableness. 27' The extreme view of these views, by
historian of science Paul Feyerabend, is that rationalism in general
[h]as no identifiable content and reason no recognizable agenda
over and above the principles of the party that happens to have ap-
propriated its name. All it does now is to lend class to the general
drive towards monotony. It is time to disengage Reason from this
drive and, as it has been thoroughly compromised by the associa-
tion, to bid it farewell. 272
All of these concerns lie at the heart of the modern argument
over the meaning and the content of the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. They are inherent in the nature of the qualifica-
tion itself.
E. Articulable Reasonableness and the Presumption of Innocence
From the very beginning, the reasonable-doubt instruction was
intertwined with the presumption of innocence.27 " The state held the
burden of persuasion, who must prove or disprove guilt, and the bur-
den of proof established whether the state had met its obligation, by
setting how sufficiently the state had proved the defendant's guilt.
TIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (rev. ed. 1979); RICHARD RORTY, PHI-
LOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). Twentieth century philosophers have
argued widely against over-reliance on reason. See, e.g., PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST
METHOD (2d ed. 1988).
270 See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAw 504 (2d ed. 1983) (ob-
serving that "a feeling in one's bones that is proved correct deserves respect regardless
of the grounds of the feeling").
271 This recognition results largely from two arguments, that the sentiments or
emotions are sufficiently causal in reasonable decisions for reasons to be sole causes
in reasonable decisions, see, e.g., Virginia Black, Good Reasons and Reasonable Acts, 52J.
PHIL. 181-82 (1955) (elaborating on Bertrand Russell, Reason and Passion 48 THE Lis-
TENER 495 (1952)) and that the complex employment of reasons in reasonable deci-
sions obscures the role of any one or set of reasons. See, e.g., Jennifer Church,
Reasonable Irrationality, 96 MIND 354, 354 (1987) ("That there is some gap between
having reasons and being reasonable is an epistemological commonplace; it follows
from the recognition that being reasonable involves co-ordinating a variety of
reasons.").
272 PAUL FEVERABEND, FAREWELL rO REASON 13 (1987).
273 See Adams's argument in Rex v. Wemms, in 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF ADAMS, supra
note 81, at 243.
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These two separate obligations are merged in the claim that the gov-
ernment must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, even though the two standards are usually subject to sepa-
rate instructions, when the Supreme Court adopted the reasonable-
doubt standard as an interpretation of due process, it also enshrined
the standard of a presumption of innocence as a constitutional
requirement.274
Of course, the relationship between these standards is somewhat
more complex. As the whole of a case grows more complex, and as
certain defenses require proffers and rebuttals or counter-rebuttals,
the effect of shifting burdens of persuasion on the underlying burden
of proof may grow even more strained.27 5 These interrelationships
are especially keen in the relationship between the separate instruc-
tions on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence, espe-
cially in the light of verdicts that must stand on circumstantial
evidence to infer conclusions for which no direct evidence is availa-
ble.2 7" Thus, the difficulty thatjurors have in applying the reasonable-
doubt standard has given rise to concerns thatjuror confusion regard-
ing the burden of proof may affect juror application of the presump-
tion of innocence.2 77
More specifically, federal and state judges have directly attacked
the articulable doubt standard on the grounds that it reverses the pre-
sumption of innocence.278 This concern is highlighted in cases in
which a holdoutjuror is required to explain thatjuror's point of view,
after which the holdout accepts the majority's view of the evidence.2 79
274 See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 3, at 457.
275 See Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of justice: Burdens of Persua-
sion in Criminal Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977).
276 See Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof 49 HAS[INGS
L.J. 621 (1998); Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value
of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (1979).
277 For an argument that the fact-intensive instruction is the only cure for the
possibility thatjury mistakes derived from the burden of proof will alter the presump-
tion of innocence, see William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WAsH. L. REV.
329 (1995).
278 See supra note 239 for the dissenting opinions of Justice Marshall, joined by
Justice Brennan. For the dissenting opinion of New York Court of Appeals Judge
Titone, see supra note 240.
279 See, e.g., Michigan v. Wiggins, No. 219564, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 2036 (Oct.
2, 2001) (unpublished).
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Significance of Reasonable-Doubt Instructions Has Changed
The chronicle above is one in which careful divisions by the likes
of Locke and Greenleaf were built on an idea of reason as the nature
ofjudgment. It was a complicated affair, in which there was consider-
able room for the reasonable but unexpressed and inexpressable.
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the fo-
cus of something reasonable, particularly a reasonable thought, be-
came increasingly simple, if not increasingly simplistic. First it became
necessarily important. Then it became necessarily quantifiable. The
love affair with reduction of the complex to the simple and the moral
to the rational led to a linguistic drift that was rarely noticeable at any
given time but profound in its ultimate effects.
Over time, the loss of our understanding of moral certainty and
the increasing acceptance of articulability as a basis for reasonableness
underscored a great shift in thinking about judgment by ajuror. The
courts have moved the jurors' goal from a vote for the state if the state
can convince them of a fact to a vote for the state unless the defense
can convince them of a certain type of doubt. This shift highlights
two fundamental concerns regarding the role of the juror, and our
beliefs about that role.
B. The Change May Fundamentally Alter the Presumption of Innocence211°
The shift appears to reverse the presumption of guilt. Although
empirical research is necessary to determine whether this result oc-
curs as easily as it seems, articulability instructions may work in the
following way. Ajuror who would vote to convict may feel quite com-
fortable in the jury room in saying, "I think he's guilty," or at most,
"The state has proved his guilt to me beyond a reasonable doubt."
There is no apparent sense that such a juror is required to relate or
even understand the state's case in detail.
A juror who would vote to acquit following an articulability in-
struction faces a different requirement. Because a reasonable doubt is
one for which a reason must be given, this juror would seem to be
obliged to say precisely what the doubt with the state's case is and why
it is reasonable. A mere declaration that the juror is not convinced
does not seem enough; it lacks the specificity suggested.
Of course, if the juror is not convinced, then according to the
presumption of innocence, the juror is supposed to feel free to vote to
280 The central argument of this Part greatly benefited froin remarks by
participants at the University of Chicago Law and History Workshop in 2002.
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acquit. This supposition may be false in the light of the tremendous
imbalance in favor of the state suggested by an articulable doubt in-
struction. The defendant-in the face of the modern reasonable-
doubt instruction-must convince the jury of his innocence.
This effect has profound implications for our concept of the ju-
ror. The jury usually acts, particularly in criminal causes, through
unanimous decisions, or at least through the collective will of the ma-
jority. Dynamite instructions and sequestrations require jurors to con-
tinue in their deliberations until, if at all possible, they reach a verdict.
This deliberation, following judicial instruction in its management, is
thought generally to give every juror an equal voice, and to make clear
to all jurors that their role is to determine whether the state has
proved its case.
Yet the burden to justify a reasonable doubt places an added bar-
rier to the juror who would argue against the state, and it is a barrier
that is both different in kind and degree from any obligation held by a
juror who would vote with the state. This burden, created at the dawn
of the reasonable-doubt instruction, although little appreciated for
what it was, has simply grown more visible with the dumbing down of
reasonable-doubt instructions over time.
It is possible, of course, to reform the instruction, to eliminate
articulability instructions, and to leave each juror to contemplate what
is reasonable about reasonable doubt. Other forms of reform are pos-
sible as well. Not the least would be to consider the problem of juror
discretion, considered further below, in a greater light, and to allow
public independent voting for verdicts, and to require conviction only
for a unanimous vote. Or, requiring that those who would vote to
convict must be convinced in a manner that can persuade others. Or
allowing a juror who would vote to acquit to leave sequestration.
These and many other changes might balance the load for those ju-
rors who accept the defense's case. While none of these changes are
advocated here, they may at least place in relief the effect of requiring
acquittal-voting jurors to explain themselves.
C. The Instruction Intrudes on Juror Discretion
A further consideration that arises from this examination is that it
highlights the very nature of the instruction as a limitation on the
discretion of the juror. The instruction represents an attempt by the
experts of the legal system to impose a series of limits on how the
jurors will use their discretion. They are not to act independently but
only as the law would have them act in their role. This particular limit
on discretion is one that might be fundamentally immoral.
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The state is morally bound to give discretion to act when it holds
an official responsible for an act: a particular responsibility requires
conferring a concurrent power to exercise that responsibility.28' The
nature of this discretion may be quite variable, and in the case of vari-
ous types of officials the discretion may be bounded by limits includ-
ing, for example, the scope of office of the nature of the task then
before the official. Most importantly for the difference between pro-
fessional legal officials and lay jurors, legal officials such as judges are
often limited in their discretion by their ability to articulate and assign
reasons for a decision.
The judge holds, of course, a fundamentally different form of dis-
cretion from that of the jury. The judge is bound to act in questions
of the law itself, in a manner that allows review of the basis for the
decision by other officials, as well as allowing other officials to apply
these bases of decision to later questions. The juror's function is
much more narrow, to use its bestjudgment to decide whether a crim-
inal defendant did, as a matter of historical fact, do what has been
alleged.28 2 The discretion needed for such a task is not to be con-
strained by obligations to convince others of the correctness of a deci-
sion, or to allow others to review it. The discretion needed is the
independence necessary to reach a judgment that allows the juror to
vote without reservations, without doubts, in the certainty that the ju-
ror has done all that can be done to give a fair verdict.
The juror has been given a task that demands only one power,
the discretion to reach an independent judgment.28 3" A limitation on
the forms ofjudgment the juror may apply to the evidence presented
281 This form of discretion is held both in thejury as a whole unit and in the jurors
individually. A central notion of discretion is autonomy, and yet when the nature of a
particular grant of discretion is to be vested in a unit, the autonomy is then of that
unit. For a wide ranging model of legal discretion, albeit with an English edge, see
D.J. GALLIGAN, DISCRFTIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL DIScRETIION
(1986).
282 This difference in the form of legal authority is fundamental, with the author-
ity of the decision of judges based on the fit with the rational rules of other legal
officials but that of jurors being largely traditional and representational. See MAX
WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIErv 212-99 (1968).
283 Ed Rubin has made a persuasive case that discretion is a term often used by
lawyers to reflect acts of policy making and that the term should be abandoned. Ed-
ward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CnI-KENr L. REV. 1299, 1300 (1997).
His model of discretion as an obsolete term for policymaking does not, however, ap-
ply to the jury, whose actions are not policy in the sense of actions that are to have
general effect over time and among different people. The jury acts in each instance
with effects limited solely to the defendant or defendants then before it. The discre-
tion of the jury may, then, be an exception to Rubin's rule.
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in the trial is a limit on discretion, on the powers necessary to perform
that task. Looking at the sum of the moral notions that might apply in
the state's obligations to the juror, there is no question that the limit
of juror independence is an immoral burden placed by state officials
on the citizen-juror.
The moral problem of limited juror independence is heightened
once the lens of the burdens on the juror is widened to encompass
not only the decision itself but also the legal and social responsibility
for the decision. Simply put, the juror is blamed for the law's
errors.
28 4
The successes and mistakes in investigation, arrest, and prosecu-
tion are placed before the jury. The jury alone must decide the facts
of the case and the guilt of the accused. Once that decision is
reached, the scrutiny that is made of it is very limited. A judge,
whether in trial or on appeal, must set aside a jury verdict only if the
judge believes the verdict is so outrageous that no reasonable jury
could reach it.28 15 So long as the evidence presented in the case makes
a decision a close call, a judge is unlikely to disturb a jury verdict.
Thus, the harder the case, the more judicial reliance on the jury's
decision there will likely be.
The jury is a scapegoat for the law. The juror immunizes the po-
lice, judge, and lawyers from mistakes prior to trial. Judges will not
correct mistakes made by police or the lawyers or other judges unless
the jury would likely have reached another decision if the mistake had
not occurred. And, jurors immunize mistakes made after the trial.
Judges need not much concern themselves that the condemned de-
fendant is innocent, as that was ajob for the jury. An actual error, the
wrongful conviction of an innocent, is the fault of the jury.
One further moral attribute of the instruction's limit on juror in-
dependence deserves brief mention. There is a strong argument that
the cross-cultural effect of suddenly moving a juror from outside the
subculture of legal discourse into the realm of legal discourse contrib-
utes to juror confusion when confronted with legal discourse.
Whether there is any meaning to a term like "reasonable doubt" in
284 For a passionate exposition on the requirements for this burden, see Sherman
J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 Mici. L. RFV. 2381 (1999).
285 The courts apply the same limit on jury judgment to other realms of compari-
son to the jtuy's decision. The idea of judgment non obstante veredicto, or judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, particularly in the criminal motion for judgment of ac-
quittal, which asks the court to find the evidence presented by the state is "insufficient
to sustain a conviction of such offense," turns on whether a reasonable jury can find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See FED R. CRIM. P. 29; see aL~oJackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).
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the law depends on the sub-culture of law, not on the culture outside.
It is thus no surprise that there is such confusion over such a term that
lawyers and judges will refuse to explain to confused juries. Regard-
less of whether lawyers understand what "reasonable doubt" means,
there is a sense of deception in which jurors are told to work with
tools they cannot understand. To so limit a person's judgment, even
to common sense with such a limit, is not only to limit independence
of judgment but to interject doubts as to the appropriate method of
judging. To the degree a juror suffers such confusion, it undermines
the very responsibility that the law demands the juror accept.
Given that the law places moral blame for errors made by legal
officials on the juror, any limit on the juror's careful judgment that is
required by law must be viewed with deep suspicion. The contradic-
tory obligations of a legal barrier to independent judgment at a mo-
ment when the law demands independent judgment must be seen as
an immoral burden upon the juror. There is a different problem of
moral agency that arises from a jury limited in its independence by
the legal officials themselves.
The idea that a layman is better suited for the job of assessing
guilt than is a specialist is ancient and significant in the culture. That
the independence of a citizen in this role might be limited by the
specialists, and that the specialists might have a discreet thumb on the
balance in that limitation, does not fit well with the cultural role of the
jury as the triers of criminal fact and guilt, or even with the jury's role
as scapegoat. That role, assigned to the non-specialist, is well de-
scribed by an English essayist of some decades past. In considering
the role, a very simple basis for a'moral limit on officials is suggested;
let the juror get on with the job without limits set by the lawyers on
how the job will be done:
Now, it is a terrible business to mark a man out for the vengeance of
men. But it is a terrible thing to which a man can grow accustomed,
as he can to other terrible things; he can grow accustomed to the
sun. And the horrible thing about all legal officials, even the
best ... is simply that they have got used to it .....
Our civilization has decided, and veryjustly decided, that determin-
ing the guilt or innocence of men is a thing too important to be
trusted to trained men. [When i]t wishes for light upon that awful
matter, it asks men who know no more law than I know, but who
can feel the things that I felt in the jury box. When it wants a library
catalogued, or the solar system discovered, or any trifle of that kind,
it uses tip its specialists. But when it wishes anything done which is
really serious, it collects twelve of the ordinary men standing
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around. The same thing was done, if I remember right, by the
Founder of Christianity.
286
D. There Is a Need for Further Empirical Research
It is clear that the current standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt has deep normative and descriptive frailties. There remains,
however, an empirical gap of whether, in any one case, a jury is more
likely to reach an historically accurate and morally justified verdict by
one instruction or another.28 7 How much influence the instructions
have in jury deliberations is difficult to measure, and how much of a
286 G.K. CHESTERTON, TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 67-68 (1910).
287 There have been, of course, studies ofjuror comprehension and variation in
the face of differing instructions. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells,
Deadly Confusion:Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1993)
(describing Capital Jury Proiect survey of South Carolina jurors which found that ju-
rors do not understand the nuances of the reasonable-doubt instruction, and the con-
fuision may enhance a bias toward conviction and a death sentence) (on the CJP, see
also William J. Bowers, The Capital Juy Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995)); Stephen P. Garvey, et al., Correcting Deadly Confu-
sion: Responding toJuy Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 627 (2000) (illus-
trating that clarification of instruction significantly aided juror comprehension in
mock jury study); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Crimi-
nal/uy Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23
U. MicH J.L. REF. 401, 414-16 (1990) (noting that Michigan jurors who were in-
structed on reasonable doubt were more likely to believe, correctly, that they can use
their common sense but less likely to believe, correctly, that they may draw inferences
from the evidence than were control jurors who were not instructed on reasonable
doubt); Bradley Saxton, Ilow Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test
Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59 (1998)
(revealing that between an eighth and a third of jurors failed to comprehend reasona-
ble-doubt instruction). Similar results were reached in earlier studies. -See HARRY
KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, TI-IE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve
Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROns 205 (1989); William S. Geimer &
Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death
Penalty Cases, 15 Am.J. CRIM. L. 1 (1988); Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understand-
ingofthe Law in Real Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539 (1992);J. Alexander Tanford,
The Law and Psychology f/juror Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71 (1990); David U. Strawn
& Raynond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUI)ICATURE 478
(1976). In part, the failure of jurors to understand instructions perfectly is that they
are crafted with a higher priority on accurate depiction of the law than on the law's
clarity or comprehensibility. Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science
Teaches Us About the/]ny Instruction Process, 3 Psv., PUBLIC PoL'V & L. 589, 591 (1997).
These results have been in line with the earliest of such projects. See A.P. Sealey et
al., Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208, 215-19 (illustrating that
jurors in rape case tended to vary verdict with varied instruction; jurors in theft case
did not). Despite this volume of study, the author is aware of none that have been
conducted to test the utility of the articulable doubt instruction, particularly none in
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difference one instruction might have over another must be a tremen-
dously fact-intensive and context-sensitive endeavor.
The empirical doubt is greatest when asking whether a jury is
more likely to arrive at a verdict that is in keeping with the historical
facts, given the limitations of the availability, discovery, and presenta-
tion of evidence by the state. Given a presumption of innocence in
the accused and an obligation of the state to prove criminal guilt, a
crime that is poorly investigated or proved might well lead to a case in
which the accused has committed the crime alleged but in which the
jury is obliged to find the state has not proved the defendant's guilt.
This danger, however, is one that simply cannot be minimized at the
expense of lax standards of conviction without two immediate conse-
quences: the higher likelihood of conviction of defendants who are
innocent and the diminished moral justification of the punishment.
The holy grail of criminal law is to set its procedures so that all
criminal defendants who have, in fact, committed crimes are pun-
ished for these crimes, but all those who are innocent but arrested are
acquitted. Although there are those who believe that perfection in
criminal law is dangerous to pursue, 288 a standard of procedure in
which this level of protection and inquisition would be achieved
would be by that very factjustified; a truly more accurate criminal pro-
cess would have both more convictions and fewer false convictions.
Furthermore, all of the agents who act in accordance with such a mar-
velous standard would be acting with a sound basis that the retributive
and social goals of the law are satisfied by their conduct.
comparison to other forms of instruction, such as certainty or an undefined standard
of reasonable doubt.
288 See, e.g., MACKLIN FLEMING, THE PRICE OF PERFEC-TJusTICE: THE ADVERSE CONSE-
QUENCES OF CURRENT LEGAL DOCTRINE ON THE AMERICAN COURTROOM (1974).
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APPENDIX:
SAMPLE MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1999
Federal Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions:
The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in
civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a
fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the govern-
ment's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this
world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the
law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If,
based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him
guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that
he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find
him not guilty.
California:
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until
the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether
[his] [her] guilt is satisfactorily shown, [he] [she] is entitled to a ver-
dict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the People the bur-
den of proving [him] [her] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible
doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the
entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the
minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an
abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.
If you find [the] [a] defendant in this case guilty of murder of
the first degree, you must then determine if [one or more of] the
following special circumstance[s]: [is] [are] true or not true:
and ]. The People have the burden of proving the
truth of a special circumstance. If you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether a special circumstance is true, you must find it to be not true.
[If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was [a co-
conspirator] [or] [an aider or abettor] [either [the actual killer] [a
co- conspirator] or an aider or abettor, but you are unable to decide
which], then you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
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defendant with intent to kill [participated as a co-conspirator with]
[or] [aided [and abetted]] an actor in commission of the murder in
the first degree, in order to find the special circumstance to be true.]
[On the other hand, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was the actual killer, you need not find that the defendant
intended to kill a human being in order to find the special circum-
stance to be true.] [You must decide separately as to each of the de-
fendants the existence or nonexistence of each special circumstance
alleged in this case. If you cannot agree as to all the defendants, but
can agree as to one or more of them, you make your finding as to the
one or more upon which you do agree.] [You must decide separately
each special circumstance alleged in this case [as to each of the de-
fendants]. If you cannot agree as to all of the special circumstances,
but can agree as to one [or more of them], you must make your find-
ing as to the one [or more] upon which you do agree.] In order to
find a special circumstance alleged in this case to be true or untrue,
you must agree unanimously. You will state your special finding as to
whether the special circumstance is or is not true on the form that will
be supplied.
(b) Death Penalty Trial
CALJIC 8.87 PENALTY TRIAL-OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIV-
ITY-PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that
the defendant [ ] (name of defendant) has committed the
following criminal [act[s]] [activity]: [ ] which
involved (describe criminal [act[s]] [activity]) [the express or implied
use of force or violence] [or] [the threat of force or violence]. Before
ajuror may consider any criminal [act[s]] [activity] as an aggravating
circumstance in this case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant [_ (name of ] did in
fact commit the criminal [act[s]] defendant) [activity]. Ajuror may
not consider any evidence of any other criminal [act [s]] [activity] as
an aggravating circumstance. It is not necessary for alljurors to agree.
If any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the criminal
activity occurred, that juror may consider that activity as a fact in ag-
gravation. If a juror is not so convinced, that juror must not consider
that evidence for any purpose.
Florida:
[2.03] PLEA OF NOT GUILTY; REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
BURDEN OF PROOF
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. This means you
must presume or believe the defendant is innocent. The presumption
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stays with the defendant as to each material allegation in the Informa-
tion through each stage of the trial until it has been overcome by the
evidence to the exclusion of and beyond a reasonable doubt. To over-
come the defendant's presumption of innocence, the State has the
burden of proving the following two elements:
1. The crime with which the defendant is charged was committed.
2. The defendant is the person who committed the crime.
The defendant is not required to prove anything.
Whenever the words "reasonable doubt" are used you must con-
sider the following:
A reasonable doubt is not a possible doubt, a speculative, imagi-
nary or forced doubt. Such a doubt must not influence you to return
a verdict of not guilty if you have an abiding conviction of guilt. On
the other hand, if, after carefully considering, comparing and weigh-
ing all the evidence, there is not an abiding conviction of guilt, or, if,
having a conviction, it is one which is not stable but one which wavers
and vacillates, then the charge is not proved beyond every reasonable
doubt and you must find the defendant not guilty because the doubt
is reasonable. It is to the evidence introduced upon this trial, and to it
alone, that you are to look for that proof. A reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of the defendant may arise from the evidence, conflict in the
evidence or the lack of evidence. If you have a reasonable doubt, you
should find the defendant not guilty. If you have no reasonable
doubt, you should find the defendant guilty.
[2.04] WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE
It is up to you to decide what evidence is reliable. You should use
your common sense in deciding which is the best evidence, and which
evidence should not be relied upon in considering your verdict. You
may find some of the evidence not reliable, or less reliable than other
evidence.
1. Did the witness seem to have an opportunity to see and know
the things about which the witness testified?
2. Did the witness seem to have an accurate memory?
3. Was the witness honest and straightforward in answering the
attorneys' questions?
4. Did the witness have some interest in how the case should be
decided?
5. Does the witness' testimony agree with the other testimony and
other evidence in the case?
You may rely on your own conclusion about the witness. A juror
may believe or disbelieve all or any part of the evidence or the testi-
mony of any witness.
THE METAMORPHOSES OF REASONABLE )OUBT
[2.05] RULES FOR DELIBERATION
These are some general rules that apply to your discussion. You
must follow these rules in order to return a lawful verdict:
1. You must follow the law as it is set out in these instructions. If
you fail to follow the law, your verdict will be a miscarriage of justice.
There is no reason for failing to follow the law in this case. All of
us are depending upon you to make a wise and legal decision in this
matter.
2. This case must be decided only upon the evidence that you
have heard from the answers of the witnesses and have seen in the
form of the exhibits in evidence and these instructions.
3. This case must not be decided for or against anyone because
you feel sorry for anyone, or are angry at anyone.
4. Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about
them should not influence your decision in this case.
5. Your duty is to determine if the defendant is guilty or not
guilty, in accord with the law. It is the judge's job to determine what a
proper sentence would be if the defendant is guilty.
6. Whatever verdict you render must be unanimous, that is, each
juror must agree to the same verdict.
Give 7 if applicable
7. It is entirely proper for a lawyer to talk to a witness about what
testimony the witness would give if called to the courtroom. The wit-
ness should not be discredited by talking to a lawyer about his
testimony.
8. Feelings of prejudice, bias or sympathy are not legally reason-
able doubts and they should not be discussed by any of you in any way.
Your verdict must be based on your views of the evidence, and on the
law contained in these instructions.
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